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This study examines how anticipated disruption in the target’s existing operations affects the 
importance that acquirers place on the target’s historical accounting information in the acquirer’s 
merger pricing decisions. A target’s past earnings and past earnings quality are informative about the 
performance of its stand-alone operations while its book value is informative about its adaptation 
value, which is the potential value from alternative uses of its resources. The information in past 
earnings and past earnings quality about a target’s stand-alone operations is likely to be more 
important to acquirers that intend to keep the target’s operations intact post-merger while the 
information in book value about its adaptation value is likely to be more important to acquirers that 
anticipate significant disruption of the target’s operations.  
I capture the level of disruption in two ways. First, I use the financial versus operating acquirer 
distinction used commonly in the finance literature. Prior research suggests that the merger goals of 
financial acquirers that buy operating companies require relatively less disruption of the target’s 
operations than the merger goals of operating acquirers that buy operating companies. Second, to 
exploit cross-sectional variation in the degree of disruption among operating acquirers, I create an 
index comprised of the following four variables: (1) target management turnover, (2) target analyst 




For both measures, I find that acquirers assign greater discounts to targets’ pre-merger 
earnings performance and pre-merger earnings quality in setting their bids as anticipated disruption 
of targets’ operations increases, presumably because the information the target’s past earnings 
conveys about its pre-merger operations is less important to acquirers that anticipate disrupting those 
operations. In addition, acquirers assign greater premiums on targets’ pre-merger book values in 
setting their bids as anticipated disruption increases, presumably because the information the target’s 
recent book value conveys about the adaptation value of its resources is more important to acquirers 
that plan to disrupt the target’s operations.  
To extend my main findings, I examine post-merger consequences related to disruption. First, 
I assess whether there are economic consequences when acquirers ignore disruption in their pricing 
decisions. I predict and find that the likelihood of post-merger goodwill impairment increases when 
acquirers do not vary the weight they placed on the target’s accounting inputs (earnings, book value 
and earnings quality) based on anticipated disruption of the target’s existing operations. Second, I 
examine how managers’ ability to forecast merger performance varies by disruption. Goodman et al. 
(2014) argue that managers’ general forecasting ability as reflected in their publicly released 
management forecasts translates into the ability to make the necessary forecasts for investments such 
as mergers and acquisitions. I argue and find that this relationship varies based on disruption and 
provide evidence that suggests that managers who make more accurate earnings forecasts are better 
able to assess external projects due to their ability to properly use past earnings to predict future 
earnings. Collectively, these findings provide important insights into the conditions under which 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Mergers are common and economically significant strategic investments. In the year 2013 
alone, there were approximately 12,000 announced mergers in North America with a total value of 
$1.5 trillion dollars1. Analysis of the target’s historical financial performance is an essential part of 
any acquirer’s due diligence (Carney, 2009; Weston et al., 2004). Consistent with this notion, prior 
research examines the average importance of the target’s earnings quality on the acquirer’s bid price 
(Skaife and Wangerin, 2013; McNichols and Stubben, 2012; Raman et al., 2012).  In this paper, I 
examine whether there is variation in the importance acquirers place on the target’s historical 
accounting information in their merger pricing decisions. I focus on three accounting inputs: the 
target’s recent earnings performance, the target’s most recent book value of equity, and the target’s 
recent earnings quality.  
In light of the well-established importance of historical earnings in valuing firms on a stand-
alone basis, their relevance in valuing targets in the merger context seems intuitive. However, it is 
not obvious that the target’s historical earnings are equally relevant across all mergers because the 
factors that contribute to the importance of earnings in the traditional valuation context do not 
necessarily hold for all mergers. Specifically, the importance of earnings in the traditional valuation 
context derives from the ability of past earnings to predict future earnings via earnings persistence 
(Sloan, 1996; Ou and Penman, 1989; Bernard and Thomas, 1990; Fairfield and Yohn, 2001). The 
predictive ability of historical earnings may be undermined in the merger context if the underlying 
operations that drove the target’s earnings generating process prior to the merger are disrupted as a 
result of the merger. Consistent with this possibility, Bruner (2004) argues that the target’s historical 
accounting information is not useful in target valuation due to its backward looking properties. 
                                                          
1 According to the Institute of Mergers, Acquisitions and Alliances, www.imaa-institute.org. 
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Because the merger context differs from the traditional valuation context, this study examines 
circumstances in which the target’s historical earnings performance is more or less relevant in target 
valuation. 
I extend this examination to include the target’s book value and the target’s past earnings 
quality because both are potentially useful inputs to acquirers’ pricing decisions. Specifically, the 
target’s book value reflects adaptation value, which is the value of the firm’s resources independent 
of how they are used (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997). Information about adaptation value is 
potentially useful to acquirers in assessing the value of alternative uses for the target’s resources. The 
target’s earnings quality can facilitate merger valuation by contributing to greater transparency about 
the target’s operations.  
The information in the target’s past earnings and past earnings quality about its pre-existing 
operations is of limited usefulness in forecasting post-merger outcomes when the acquirer plans to 
substantially change the target’s operations. Therefore, I predict that the acquirer discounts both the 
target’s historical earnings and the target’s earnings quality when setting merger premium to a greater 
degree as anticipated disruption of the target’s existing operations increases. Because the target’s 
book value reflects information about the adaptation value of its resources, book value may be more 
informative than earnings in determining merger value when the acquirer expects to disrupt the 
target’s existing operations. I predict that the acquirer places greater weight on the target’s book value 
in setting the merger premium as anticipated disruption of the target’s existing operations increases.  
My main empirical tests regress the premium paid by the acquirer on these accounting inputs. 
Because the denominator of the premium is the target’s pre-merger stock price, the coefficients on 
the accounting inputs capture the average difference between acquirers’ and the market’s valuation 
of these inputs. An insignificant coefficient on an accounting input indicates no average difference 
between acquirers’ and the market’s valuation of the input. By contrast a positive (negative) 
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coefficient on the accounting input indicates that acquirers assign a premium (discount) to the 
accounting input relative to the market’s pre-merger valuation. To test my predictions, I examine 
whether there is cross-sectional variation in the premium or discount acquirers assign to these inputs 
based on the degree of disruption associated with the merger.  
To capture the level of disruption, I first use the financial versus operating acquirer distinction 
used commonly in the finance literature (Bargeron et al., 2008; Gorbenko and Maleko, 2013; Dittmar 
et al., 2012; Martos-Vila et al., 2012). Financial acquirers include divisions of investment banks, 
private equity firms, and investor groups. Prior research identifies among the goals of financial 
acquirers that buy operating companies potential tax savings, access to internal markets, lower cost 
of capital, diversification of cash flow streams, and extraction of gains from well-managed but 
undervalued targets (Leland, 2007; Lewellen, 1970; Mueller, 1969; Hubbard and Palia, 1999). In 
general, the financial acquirer does not need to significantly alter the operations of its operating 
company target to achieve these benefits. By contrast, operating company acquirers seek to achieve 
gains through the synergistic combination of the acquirer’s and target’s resources. Realization of such 
synergies typically requires the acquirer to adapt or redeploy the target’s resources. Specifically, 
acquirers can generate synergies by better managing underperforming assets of the target or by 
exploiting complementarities between the acquirer’s and target’s assets to create new products, 
services or delivery channels (Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999; Hoberg and Phillips, 2010; Rhodes-
Kropf and Robinson, 2008). Therefore, I expect mergers with operating acquirers to entail more 
disruption of the target’s existing operations than mergers with financial acquirers.  
Although I expect mergers with operating acquirers to entail more disruption than mergers 
with financial acquirers on average, I also expect variation in the degree of disruption among 
operating acquirers. I, therefore, test whether the importance of the accounting inputs varies cross-
sectionally among mergers completed by operating acquirers. To capture cross-sectional variation in 
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disruption among operating acquirers, I create an index comprised of the following four variables: (1) 
target management turnover, (2) target analyst turnover, (3) anticipated merger restructuring costs, 
and (4) the distance between acquirer and target headquarters. Target management turnover, which is 
the turnover rate for the top executive of the target firm following the merger, captures the likelihood 
that the acquirer intends to intervene in the target’s operations by installing a new top management 
team. Target analyst turnover is the post-merger turnover rate for target analysts and captures the 
extent to which they anticipate the target’s earnings time series to remain relatively predictable. 
Analysts who anticipate significant changes in the earnings process are presumably more likely to 
drop coverage. Anticipated merger restructuring costs capture integration costs, which presumably 
correspond in degree to the disruption of the target’s operations. Distance between acquirer and target 
headquarters locations captures acquirers’ anticipation of actively managing targets’ assets.  
I validate the disruption index by examining the extent to which it identifies transactions in 
which targets’ pre-merger earnings performance is less useful in predicting the performance of the 
merged entity. Specifically, I estimate the autoregressive parameter for the pre-merger earnings of a 
hypothetical firm comprised of both the acquirer and target. I find that this parameter is a worse 
predictor of the actual post-merger earnings of the merged firm as the disruption index increases, 
which indicates that the index captures changes in the earnings generating process associated with 
greater degrees of disruption. 
My sample for tests that compare financial and operating acquirers consists of 120 merger 
transactions reported in the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) database completed by financial 
acquirers during 1980 to 2012 and 120 mergers by operating acquirers over the same period matched 
on target characteristics (operating-financial sample). I find that financial acquirers’ valuation of 
accounting inputs aligns with the market’s pre-merger valuation, consistent with the minimal 
disruption typically associated with mergers by financial firms.  However, I find that operating 
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acquirers’ valuation of accounting inputs differs significantly from that of financial acquirers, 
consistent with the relatively greater disruption associated with mergers by operating firms. 
Specifically, I find that, unlike financial acquirers, operating acquirers discount the target’s historical 
earnings and earnings quality. On the other hand, operating acquirers place greater weight on the 
target’s book value than financial acquirers. This result indicates that, relative to financial acquirers, 
operating acquirers are more interested in the target’s adaptation value as reflected in book value. 
Collectively, these results support my prediction that the relevance of the target’s historical 
accounting information depends on the degree of anticipated disruption. 
My sample for tests that examine cross-sectional variation in disruption among operating 
acquirers, also drawn from the SDC database, consists of 188 transactions completed between 1994 
and 2010 in which both acquirer and target were public, operating companies (operating only sample). 
Consistent with my previous results, I find that operating acquirers’ valuation of accounting inputs 
most closely aligns with the market’s pre-merger valuation when disruption is minimal. However, as 
disruption increases, operating acquirers discount the target’s historical earnings and earnings quality 
to a greater extent and assign greater weight to the target’s book value. These findings further support 
the conclusion that the relevance of the target’s historical accounting information depends on the 
anticipated degree of disruption.  
I extend my main findings by examining the post-merger implications of disruption. First, I 
examine whether there are economic consequences when acquirers ignore disruption. To the extent 
disruption is an economically significant factor for acquirers to consider, failure to consider this factor 
may increase the risk of initial overpayment or may reflect insufficient attention to important details 
needed for successful integration (Zollo and Singh, 2004; Pablo et al., 1996; Jemison and Sitkin, 
1986). In either case, the post-merger performance of the combined entity will fail to justify the initial 
purchase price, thereby giving rise to goodwill impairments. Therefore, I predict that the likelihood 
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of post-merger goodwill impairment increases when acquirers do not vary the weight they placed on 
the target’s accounting inputs (earnings, book value and earnings quality) based on anticipated 
disruption of the target’s existing operations. I use residuals from a pricing model that incorporates 
anticipated disruption of the target’s operations to capture deviations from predicted pricing behavior. 
I expect and find a positive relationship between these deviations and the likelihood of subsequent 
goodwill impairment using logit estimation. This finding suggests that the likelihood of post-merger 
goodwill impairment increases when acquirers do not vary the weight they place on the target’s 
accounting inputs based on anticipated disruption of the target’s existing operations. To better isolate 
the deviation that is specifically related to disruption, I regress goodwill impairment occurrence and 
the residual of a pricing model that excludes anticipated disruption.  I predict and find that the residual 
from the full model that includes disruption provides a better fit for a model explaining subsequent 
goodwill impairments than the residual from the model that excludes disruption.  
I also examine how managers’ ability to forecast merger performance varies by disruption. 
Goodman et al. (2014) argue that managers’ general forecasting ability as reflected in their publicly 
released management forecasts translates into the general ability to make the necessary forecasts for 
investments such as mergers and acquisitions. Consistent with this notion they find that acquirers 
with greater forecast accuracy experience superior post-merger performance and lower likelihood of 
goodwill impairment. I examine whether this finding varies by disruption. If their finding is driven 
by managers’ ability to properly use past earnings to predict future earnings then the negative relation 
they document between acquirers’ forecast accuracy and subsequent goodwill impairments will be 
less pronounced as disruption increases. By contrast, if their finding is driven by managers' ability to 
forecast outcomes that are independent of past earnings then the negative relation between acquirers’ 
forecast accuracy and subsequent goodwill impairments will be more pronounced as disruption 
increases. I regress goodwill impairment occurrence on the acquiring manager’s three-year forecast 
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accuracy average and examine whether there are any cross-sectional differences based on the degree 
of disruption associated with the merger.  I find that the negative association between the acquirer’s 
historical management forecast accuracy and likelihood of post-merger goodwill impairment 
becomes less pronounced as disruption increases. This finding suggests that managers' ability to use 
past earnings to predict future earnings contributes to better post-merger outcomes, particularly in 
mergers with low disruption.  
This study makes several contributions. First, it adds to an emerging literature on the role of 
accounting information in target valuation. Prior research finds that target earnings quality plays an 
important role in merger pricing and outcomes (Skaife and Wangerin, 2013; Raman et al., 2012; 
McNichols and Stubben, 2012; Martin and Shalev, 2009; Marquardt and Zur, 2014). Whereas this 
stream of research documents the importance of targets’ historical earnings information in the merger 
setting, on average, I demonstrate that its importance varies with the degree of disruption associated 
with a merger. This insight should be relevant to acquirers that must determine the appropriate degree 
of reliance on historical target accounting information in formulating their bids and to analysts and 
investors who must determine the appropriate response to merger announcements.  
Second, this paper provides insights on whether managers appropriately use accounting 
information in pricing transactions. Despite the prevalence of mergers, there is mixed evidence on 
whether they create or destroy value (Louis, 2004; Andrade et al., 2001; Berger and Ofek, 1995; Lang 
and Stulz, 1994; Healy et al., 1992, 1997), calling into question whether acquirers make decisions 
that maximize firm value when pursuing such deals. I find that acquirers’ valuation of accounting 
inputs aligns with the market’s pre-merger valuation in cases where anticipated disruption is minimal. 
However, as anticipated disruption increases, acquirers’ valuation of accounting inputs departs from 
the market’s pre-merger valuation in economically sensible ways. This evidence that acquirers adjust 
their use of targets’ historical accounting information based on the anticipated degree of disruption 
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of targets’ operations is consistent with managers’ appropriate use of accounting information in their 
pricing decisions. 
Finally, this paper provides evidence on the different information provided by the target’s 
historical earnings and book values in the merger setting. Specifically, the predictive information 
content of the target’s historical earnings for future earnings of the merged firm is less relevant to 
acquirers when they anticipate significant disruption to the target’s operations as a result of the 
merger. By contrast, the information contained in the target’s book value about adaptation value is 
more relevant to acquirers in transactions where they anticipate significant disruption as a result of 
adapting or redeploying the target’s resources. 
The remainder of this study proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 discusses the relevant literature 
and develops the hypotheses. Chapter 3 describes variable measurement and research design. 






Chapter 2: Related Literature and Hypothesis Development 
2.1  The potential payoffs to mergers 
Mergers and acquisitions represent a common form of corporate strategic investment that can 
generate payoffs to the acquirer in a variety of ways. At the most basic level, an acquirer can realize 
gains simply by buying a well-managed but undervalued target without disrupting the target’s existing 
operations— a strategy Warren Buffett famously advocates (Greenwald et al., 2001).  In this case, 
the target’s already established earnings generating process drives the anticipated merger payoffs.  
An acquirer can also achieve gains through the synergistic combination of the acquirer’s and 
target’s resources. The realization of synergies typically requires the acquirer to disrupt the target’s 
existing operations and to adapt or redeploy the target’s resources. For example, the q-theory argues 
that mergers can generate synergies by unlocking the value in underperforming assets by placing them 
under better management (Manne, 1965; Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002). This process traditionally 
involves more efficient acquirers purchasing less efficient targets so that the acquirers’ relative 
expertise can be transferred to the target’s assets (Martin and McConnell, 1991).2 On the other hand, 
Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson (2008) argue that another way for mergers to create synergies is by 
bringing complementary assets under common control, thereby reducing the hold-up problems and 
underinvestment related to incomplete contracting (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990; 
Hart, 1995).  In either case, the expected merger payoffs from synergies are driven by anticipated new 
uses of the target’s resources rather than by the target’s already established earnings generating 
process. 
Regardless of the anticipated source of payoff, an acquirer must pay no more than the 
present value of the future payoffs the merger is expected to generate to ensure that the merger 
                                                          




enhances value. That is, an acquirer must estimate the merger’s future payoffs to guard against 
overpayment. Accounting has a natural conceptual role to play in facilitating the forecasts of merger 
payoffs given that the key objective of general purpose financial reporting as set forth by the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board in Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts (SFAC) No. 
8 is to provide information that is useful to investors in assessing “the amount, timing, and 
uncertainty of (the prospects for) future net cash inflows of an entity” (SFAC No. 8, paragraph 
OB3).  Therefore, I examine the potential usefulness of accounting inputs for forecasting merger 
payoffs. I also explore the possibility that the usefulness of accounting inputs for this purpose varies 
based on the degree of disruption of target operations that the merger entails.  
 
2.2  The information content of various accounting inputs for merger valuation  
2.2.1 Accounting and valuation 
 
As discussed in section 2.1, the key objective of financial reports is to provide information 
that facilitates the formulation of forecasts for investment purposes. Accounting researchers have 
devoted considerable attention to examining the role of accounting information for valuation. Ohlson 
(1995) derives a model of equity value based only on book value and earnings, which are the two 
primary summary measures from the accounting system. A large body of empirical research 
documents strong associations between these accounting measures and stock prices, indicating that 
these measures are highly value relevant (e.g. Barth et al., 1998, Collins et al., 1997, Collins et al., 
1999, Core et al., 2003, Francis and Schipper, 1999, Penman and Sougiannis, 1998). More recently, 
researchers have posited and provided evidence that earnings quality, which captures the extent to 
which reported earnings reflect the firm’s underlying economics (Barth et al., 2001), is also useful 
for valuation by lowering investors’ estimation risk (e.g. Francis et al.; 2008; Francis et al., 2004; 
Francis et al., 2005; Barth et al., 2013).  Prior research focuses on the role of accounting in valuing 
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firms on a stand-alone basis. Implicit in this focus is the going concern assumption wherein an entity 
is expected to continue without disruption (Accounting Standards Codification 205-40). Because this 
assumption is violated to varying degrees in the merger context, I examine how the disruption 
associated with mergers affects the usefulness of earnings, book value, and earnings quality for 
valuation in the merger context. 
2.2.2 Earnings 
 
The dividend discount model is the conceptual benchmark for all equity valuation (Gordon 
and Shapiro, 1956). In response to the practical challenge of forecasting an infinite stream of future 
dividends, researchers have derived various models for valuing an individual firm’s equity that are 
consistent with the dividend discount model but that are stated only in terms of current and forecasted 
accounting inputs (Penman, 1998; Penman and Sougiannis, 1998; Frankel and Lee, 1998; Francis et 
al., 2000; Courteau et al., 2001).  A key insight underlying accounting-based valuation is that an 
analyst can derive equity value estimates that are consistent with the dividend discount model by 
forecasting a firm's dividend paying ability rather than by explicitly forecasting the stream of future 
dividends (Ohlson, 1995). Because future earnings coincides with a firm's dividend paying ability 
(Beaver, 1989), forecasting future earnings is a key valuation task. Prior research demonstrates that 
earnings exhibit strong first-order autocorrelation (Beaver, 1970; Ball and Watts, 1972). This time-
series dependence in earnings provides a basis for past earnings to be useful in predicting future 
earnings (Albrecht et al., 1977; Watts and Leftwich, 1977; Lev, 1983). Implicit in the use of current 
earnings to predict future earnings in traditional valuation is the assumption of intertemporal stability 
in the firm’s earnings generating process and the assumption that the firm is anticipated to operate 
without disruption (the going concern assumption).  
In the merger context, the persistent property of historical earnings is most valuable in 
quantifying merger payoffs that depend on the target’s established operations and earnings generating 
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process (i.e., mergers with little anticipated disruption). By contrast, this property is less useful in 
quantifying benefits that do not depend on the target’s established operations and earnings generating 
process (i.e., mergers with more significant anticipated disruption). In particular, if the acquirer 
anticipates altering how the target’s resources are managed or deployed, then the historical time series 
becomes less relevant in predicting future outcomes. Consistent with this idea, Subramanyam and 
Wild (1996) find an inverse relationship between earnings informativeness and the firm’s probability 
of termination, suggesting that the firm’s going-concern status has a fundamental role in determining 
the usefulness of earnings and hence, earnings persistence. Choi and Jeter (1992) find a significant 
decrease in market responsiveness to earnings announcements after the issuance of qualified audit 
reports that call into question the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern. Similarly, Hayn 
(1995) argues that because shareholders have a liquidation option, losses are not expected to 
perpetuate. Consistent with the hypothesis, she finds that reported losses are less persistent than 
reported profits. Overall, prior research has established that the persistent properties of earnings may 
not hold in situations where the firm’s future operations face disruption (e.g. mergers).   
2.2.3 Book value 
 
In cases where earnings are of limited usefulness, accounting offers another potentially useful 
signal in the form of book value. Book value measures the net realizable value of a firm’s assets and 
is a close reflection of liquidation value (Barth et al., 1998). As a firm’s existing earnings generation 
process approaches jeopardy (e.g. when a firm's financial health decreases), its book value becomes 
relatively more relevant, as compared to earnings, to equity investors because liquidation values affect 
equity values (Barth et al. 1998; Collins et al., 1999). In addition to reflecting liquidation value, 
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) argue that book value reflects adaptation value, which is the value of 
the firm’s resources independent of how well the firm uses those resources. Adaptation value exists 
when a firm can either sell its resources to an external entity (e.g. asset sale or merger) and/or if its 
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resources can be used internally in a different way (e.g. restructuring). In the merger context, Hand 
and Lynch (1999) state that adaptation value "arises from the option the bidder has to put the target's 
assets to alternative new uses" (Hand and Lynch, 1999, p. 6). Therefore, book value may be a greater 
source of information in quantifying merger payoffs that are driven by anticipated new uses of the 
target’s resources (i.e. mergers with more significant anticipated disruption) rather than by the target’s 
already established earnings generating process. 
2.2.4 Earnings quality 
 
The target’s earnings quality is potentially useful to acquirers by enhancing the 
informativeness of the target’s pre-merger earnings about its existing operations. The target’s past 
earnings quality is likely to be most relevant to acquirers when they desire precise information about 
the target’s existing operations because they expect such operations to continue. By contrast, the 
target’s past earnings quality is likely to be less relevant to acquirers that do not anticipate relying 
heavily on the target’s existing operations to generate payoffs.  
Prior research finds a negative relation between premium and earnings quality (Skaife and 
Wangerin, 2013; Raman et al., 2012; McNichols and Stubben, 2012). McNichols and Stubben (2012) 
argue that acquiring firms of high accounting quality target firms are able to bid more effectively and 
pay less than acquiring firms of low accounting quality target firms, since higher quality accounting 
information reduces uncertainty about the value of the target. Another prevailing explanation for the 
negative relationship between premium and earnings quality is that acquirers of targets with low 
earnings quality have identified, and are willing to pay for, sources of value of the target that are not 
well reflected in either the target’s pre-merger earnings performance or its stock price. Because such 
hidden sources are value are likely to be more present in mergers that entail greater disruption, I 
examine whether the previously documented negative relation between premium and earnings quality 




2.3  Acquirers’ use of accounting inputs in merger valuation 
The preceding discussion demonstrates that accounting inputs differ in their importance in 
quantifying merger payoffs based on disruption. Accordingly, the weight acquirers place on these 
inputs when formulating their bids should vary in similar fashion if they seek to maximize the net 
present value (NPV) of their merger investments. However, it is not obvious that acquirers actually 
do consider disruption when determining the weight they place on accounting inputs given evidence 
that acquirers undertake mergers for reasons other than profit maximization. Specifically, Roll (1986) 
finds evidence that some managers suffer from hubris, leading them to enter into transactions where 
there are little to no synergistic gains. Jensen and Meckling (1976) raise the possibility of empire 
building as a motivation for mergers, wherein managers buy other companies to expand their power 
instead of maximizing the value of the firm. Finally, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) argue that managers 
may pursue mergers to “entrench” themselves so that it becomes too costly to replace them.   
  
2.4  Acquirers’ use of accounting information and post-merger outcomes 
 
The previous discussion indicates that there is uncertainty about whether acquirers will 
consider disruption when deciding the weights they place on accounting inputs in formulating their 
bids. A natural question that arises is whether there are economic consequences when acquirers ignore 
disruption. To the extent disruption is an economically significant factor for acquirers to consider, 
failure to consider this factor may increase the risk of merger underperformance via two routes. First, 
failure to consider a relevant factor in merger pricing increases the risk of initial overpayment. 
Second, failure to consider a relevant factor may reflect insufficient attention to important details 
needed for successful integration (Zollo and Singh, 2004; Pablo et al., 1996; Jemison and Sitkin, 
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1986). In either case, the post-merger performance of the combined entity will fail to justify the initial 
purchase price, thereby giving rise to goodwill impairments. 
Accounting Standards Codification (ASC) 805, effective June 30, 2001, requires acquiring 
firms to recognize the targets’ assets and liabilities at their acquisition-date fair values and to allocate 
the excess of the price paid over the fair value of the target’s identifiable net assets acquired to 
goodwill. Under ASC 350, firms must test for goodwill impairment at least annually or if events or 
changes in circumstances indicate that the carrying amount of the goodwill obtained in an acquisition 
may not be recoverable. Thus goodwill impairments may arise if implementation of the acquirer’s 
strategy goes awry and/or if the acquirer overpaid for the target (Ramanna and Watts, 2012; Li et al., 
2011).  
Prior research finds that goodwill impairments occur relatively frequently with 30-40% of 
firms with existing goodwill balances and high book to market ratios reporting goodwill impairments 
within a 3-year time period (Ramanna and Watts, 2012). Recent anecdotal examples of goodwill 
impairments include Hewlett-Packard’s $8.8 billion write-off of its 2011 acquisition of Autonomy 
Corporation and Caterpillar’s $580 million goodwill write-off of its 2012 Siwei acquisition in China. 
A major source of goodwill impairments for acquiring firms comes from target overpayment.  For 
example, Hayn and Hughes (2005) and Li et al. (2011) argue that significant premiums, presence of 
multiple bidders, and stock financing, bid characteristics that explain target overpayment, are 
predictors of future goodwill impairments. Gu and Lev (2011) also find that acquirers with overpriced 
shares at the time of the merger announcement often pay more for their targets and are more likely to 
take goodwill write-offs following the merger.  
Another major source of goodwill impairments for acquiring firms comes from insufficient 
attention to important details needed for successful integration (Zollo and Singh, 2004; Pablo et al., 
1996; Jemison and Sitkin, 1986). These details range from cultural compatibility to organizational fit 
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(Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999). For example, analysts claim that eBay and Skype were not able to 
merge successfully in 2005 because their technological systems were incompatible (Reardon, 2007). 
Consistent with analyst speculations, eBay issued a statement in 2011 claiming that it “wanted to 
unload Skype after failing to integrate the company into its core operations” (eBay, 2011).  
In this study, I also examine whether merger underperformance as reflected in goodwill write-
offs is more likely for transactions where acquirers ignore disruption.  
 
2.5  Goodwill impairments and management forecast accuracy 
 
As previously discussed, purchase price determination requires forecasting merger payoffs. 
Goodman et al. (2014) argue that managers’ general forecasting ability as reflected in their publicly 
released management forecasts translates into the ability to make the necessary forecasts for 
investments such as mergers and acquisitions. Consistent with this notion they find that acquirers 
with greater forecast accuracy experience superior post-merger performance and lower likelihood of 
goodwill impairment. I examine the possibility that this average finding varies by disruption. 
Specifically, managers’ forecast accuracy can be attributed either to their ability to effectively use 
past earnings to predict future outcomes or to their ability to predict future outcomes independent of 
past earnings.3 It is an open question from Goodman et al. (2014) which source of management 
forecast accuracy drives their overall finding. If Goodman et al. (2014)'s finding is driven by 
managers’ ability to properly use past earnings to predict future earnings then the negative relation 
they document between acquirers’ forecast accuracy and subsequent goodwill impairments will be 
less pronounced as disruption increases (based on arguments in section 2.2 that the target's past 
earnings is less important for merger pricing as disruption increases). By contrast, if their finding is 
                                                          
3 Although most prior studies consider overall management forecast accuracy, Xu (2009) and Gong, Li, and Wang 
(2011) specifically examine managers’ ability to use past earnings to generate accurate forecasts. 
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driven by managers' ability to forecast outcomes that are independent of past earnings then the 
negative relation between acquirers’ forecast accuracy and subsequent goodwill impairments will be 
more pronounced as disruption increases (based on arguments in section 2.2 that acquirers in mergers 
with greater disruption are more likely to seek sources of value that are unrelated to the target's past 
earnings). Given these contrasting possibilities, I examine whether the negative relation between 
acquirers’ forecast accuracy and subsequent goodwill impairments varies by disruption. 
 
2.6  Hypothesis Development 
As discussed in section 2.1, mergers can generate payoffs to the acquirer in a variety of ways 
that entail varying degrees of disruption to the target’s existing operations. As discussed in section 
2.2., earnings, book value, and earnings quality are potentially useful inputs in predicting these 
payoffs. However, the usefulness of each of these accounting inputs varies based on the disruption of 
the target’s operations. Specifically, earnings and earnings quality are less useful for predicting 
merger payoffs as disruption increases while book value is more useful for predicting merger payoffs 
as disruption increases. As discussed in section 2.3, acquirers will vary the weight they place on these 
accounting inputs accordingly if they seek to maximize the NPV of their merger investments. 
However, evidence that acquirers undertake mergers for reasons other than profit maximization raises 
the possibility that they might not adjust their use of accounting information accordingly. 
Based on these arguments, I propose the following hypotheses, stated in alternative form, to 
test whether managers appropriately adjust their use of accounting information for merger valuation. 
 
H1. Merger premium is less associated with the target’s historical earnings as disruption of the 




H2. Merger premium is more associated with the target’s book value as disruption of the target’s 
existing operations increases. 
 
H3. Merger premium is more negatively associated with the target’s historical earnings quality 
as disruption of the target’s existing operations increases. 
 
As discussed in section 2.4, acquirers’ failure to adequately consider disruption when using 
accounting information may increase the risk of initial overpayment or the risk of poor execution, 
both of which lead to merger underperformance. In either event, the underperformance will be 
reflected in subsequent goodwill impairments. Therefore, I test the following hypothesis, stated in the 
alternative form.  
 
H4: The likelihood of post-merger goodwill impairment increases when acquirers do not vary 
the weight they placed on the target’s accounting inputs based on anticipated disruption of 
the target’s existing operations. 
 
 As discussed in section 2.5, Goodman et al. (2014) find a negative association between 
acquirers' prior management forecast accuracy and subsequent goodwill impairments. This finding 
implies that managers who make more accurate earnings forecasts are better able to assess external 
projects, including merger opportunities. It is possible that this finding varies based on disruption. 
Specifically, managers’ forecast accuracy can derive from their ability to effectively use past 
earnings to predict future outcomes or from their ability to predict future outcomes independent of 
past earnings. Since mergers with greater disruption are less dependent on the target's prior earnings 
generating process, the negative association between management forecast accuracy and subsequent 
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goodwill impairments will be less pronounced as disruption increases if this association is driven 
primarily by managers’ ability to use past earnings to predict future earnings. On the other hand, the 
negative association will be more pronounced as disruption increases if this association is driven by 
managers’ ability to predict future earnings independent of past earnings. Given these contrasting 
possibilities, I propose the following non-directional hypothesis. 
 
H5: The association between the acquirer’s historical management forecast accuracy and the 






Chapter 3: Variable Measurement and Research Design 
3.1 Measuring disruption  
I measure disruption in two ways. First, I use the financial versus operating company 
distinction commonly used in the finance literature to identify transactions where acquirers are more 
likely to disrupt their targets’ operations. Second, I construct a disruption index based on observable 
merger characteristics. I discuss each approach in detail below. 
3.1.1 Measuring disruption based on the financial versus operating acquirer distinction 
 The financial versus operating distinction is commonly used in the finance literature (Dittmar 
et al., 2012; Bargeron et al., 2008; Gorbenko and Maleko, 2013). Financial acquirers, such as 
divisions of investment banks, private equity firms, and investor groups, generally seek to exploit 
finance-related benefits such as potential tax savings, access to internal markets, lower cost of capital, 
diversification of cash flow streams and/or the realization of gains from buying well-managed but 
undervalued targets (Leland, 2007; Lewellen, 1971). About 4% of US acquirers of public, US target 
firms are financial firms4. Prior research finds that acquirers pursuing finance-related benefits are 
more likely to keep targets as autonomous divisions and less likely to integrate them or fire their top 
management teams (Nahavandi and Malekzadeh, 1988; Pablo, 1994; Mueller, 1969; Hubbard and 
Palia, 1999). Financial acquirers, because they generally must either hire specialists or rely on the 
incumbent management to manage target assets (Fidrmuc et al., 2012), “rely primarily on improving 
the stand-alone value of the target firm” (Dittmar et al., 2012, p. 901).  
On the other hand, operating acquirers generally pursue synergies created through the 
combination of the acquirer’s and target’s assets (Larsonn and Finkelstein, 1999; Megginson and 
Smart, 2008; Chatterjee, 1986). Realization of operating synergies typically requires the acquirer to 
                                                          
4 Percentage calculated based on a sample that consists of public targets with values of less than $1 billion and more 
than $10 million recorded in the SDC Platinum data base from 1980 to 2012. 
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adapt and/or redeploy the target’s resources by better managing underperforming assets of the target 
or by exploiting complementarities between the acquirer’s and target’s assets to create new products, 
services or delivery channels (Larsonn and Finkelstein, 1999; Hoberg and Phillips, 2010; Rhodes-
Kropf and Robinson, 2008). Therefore, operating acquirers typically integrate the target’s assets into 
their existing operations (Fidrmuc et al., 2012). Hence, mergers with operating acquirers generally 
entail more disruption of the target’s underlying operations than mergers with financial acquirers.  
3.1.2 Measuring disruption using a self-constructed disruption index 
Although I expect mergers with operating acquirers to entail more disruption than mergers 
with financial acquirers on average, I also expect variation in the degree of disruption among 
operating acquirers. To examine the cross-sectional variation in disruption for mergers completed by 
operating acquirers, I create an index comprised of four variables. These variables are target 
management turnover of the combined firm (MTO), target analyst turnover (TATO), anticipated 
merger restructuring costs (RESTRUCT) and the distance between acquirer and target headquarters 
(LOCAL).  
Target management turnover, which is the turnover rate for the top executive of the target firm 
following the merger, captures the likelihood that the acquirer intends to intervene in the target’s 
operations by installing a new top management team. Prior research provides evidence that target 
management turnover surrounding merger events is high (Martin and McConnell, 1991) and is mostly 
due to overlapping skill sets (Krishnan et al., 1997). Therefore, low target management turnover 
suggests that the target’s management has a special skill that does not overlap with that of the acquirer 
and therefore, the acquirer does not intend to significantly disrupt the target’s underlying operations.  
Target analyst turnover is the turnover rate for the target’s analysts following the merger. 
Tehranian et al. (2013) find that target analysts who cover a target firm before the merger decide to 
cover the merged firm if they believe the outcome to be favorable and if they can accurately forecast 
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its earnings. Analysts are likely to drop coverage if they anticipate the target earnings process to 
change significantly consequent to a merger. Target analyst turnover captures the extent to which 
analysts anticipate the target’s earnings time series to remain relatively predictable after the merger.   
Anticipated merger restructuring costs capture integration costs. Management usually 
estimates target integration cost as the cost of restructuring charges (Houston et al., 2001). This charge 
is usually an estimate of severance payments, asset write-downs, lease buyouts and costs to shut down 
duplicative facilities. Lower anticipated restructuring costs imply less disruption to the target’s 
earnings generation process since the acquirer intends to retain more of the target’s pre-merger 
operations. 
Distance between acquirer and target headquarters location, which captures the likelihood that 
an acquirer anticipates actively managing target assets, may influence acquirers’ purchasing decisions 
(Chakrabarti and Mitchell, 2013; Coval and Moskowitz, 2001). Because acquirers that anticipate 
integrating their operations to a greater degree prefer targets that are more proximate (Chakrabarti 
and Mitchell, 2013), targets with headquarters further removed (more than 50 kilometers) from 
acquirers are more likely to operate much as they did before the merger. 
I collect target executive management information during the two-year period after the merger 
to see if the target management is still affiliated with the acquirer. Consistent with prior research, I 
consult annual reports, 10-Ks, proxy statements, and news reports for information regarding target 
management turnover (McNeil et al., 2004). Following Houston et al. (2001), I search acquirer 10-
Ks filed the same year as mergers for information regarding restructuring costs. If managers do not 
estimate these charges, I treat the merger expense reported in the annual report published at the end 
of the merger year as an ex ante estimate of merger expense (Houston et al., 2001). In the absence of 
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both estimate and expense, I assume restructuring costs to be zero and immaterial.5 I collect target 
analyst turnover information from I/B/E/S, and obtain headquarter locations of targets and acquirers 
from the SDC database, convert them to longitude and latitude coordinates, and use the Haversine 
formula to find the distance between them.6  
For each merger transaction, I assign a zero or one ranking to each criterion, sum the four 
criteria, and divide by four to calculate the disruption variable, DR_INDEX. For the management 
turnover variable, I assign a one (zero) to merger transactions in which, over the course of the two-
year post-merger period, the CEO leaves (remains with) the merged company. For the target analyst 
turnover variable, I assign a one (zero) to merger transactions in which 100% (less than 100%) of 
target analysts decide not to cover the merged firm.7 For restructuring cost, I assign a one (zero) to 
observations that fall below (above) the sample median, indicating relatively less (more) disruption. 
For the distance variable, I assign a one (zero) if the distance between acquirer and target headquarters 
is less than or equal to (greater than) 50 kilometers. DR_INDEX takes values from zero (least 
disruptive) to one (most disruptive). A DR_INDEX equal to zero indicates a merger transaction with 
minimal disruption in which the target firm is left to operate as an autonomous division of the 
acquirer, operated by the same management team that controlled it before the merger. A DR_INDEX 
equal to one indicates a merger with the highest level of disruption, such as bust-up takeovers, which 
are characterized by significant post-merger divestitures of target assets (Mitchell and Lehn, 1990; 
Berger and Ofek, 1996).  
                                                          
5 According to SFAS 146 (and EITF Issue 94-3 prior to passage of SFAS 146), costs associated with restructuring 
activity should be disclosed in notes to the financial statements. 
6I calculate the arc length, 𝑑𝑎𝑏 , between acquirer and target as 𝑑𝑎𝑏 = 𝐶{ arccos [sin(𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑎) sin(𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑏) +
cos(𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑎) cos(𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑏) cos(|𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑎 − 𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑏|)} where lat and long refer to the latitude and longitude of locations a and b. C 
is a constant that converts the result to kilometers. 
7 Tehranian et al. (2013) find that 75% of target analysts do not retain coverage of merged firms. 
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A potential limitation of DR_INDEX is that MTO and TATO are ex post measures of 
disruption and therefore the coefficient estimate of DR_INDEX may suffer from look-ahead bias. 
The underlying assumption that I make is that these ex post measures reflect ex ante levels of 
anticipated disruption and that at the time of the merger announcement, the acquiring manager knows 
the extent of anticipated disruption of the target. Since acquiring managers must estimate merger 
synergies in the determination of target valuation (Bruner 2004; Carney, 2009; Weston et al., 2004) 
and therefore must determine the target’s role in the merged firm before the effective date of the 
merger, I believe that the underlying assumption is valid. I relax this assumption with the first measure 
of disruption, the financial versus operating acquirer distinction, which is an ex ante measure. The 
main conclusions of this study are consistent using both measures. 
As described in Appendix B, I assess the construct validity of the disruption index by 
examining whether it identifies transactions in which targets’ pre-merger earnings performance is less 
useful in predicting the post-merger performance of the combined firm. 
3.2 Regression model for tests of H1 and H2 
I examine how managers use accounting information in setting merger premia by estimating 
the following regression (firm and time subscripts are not shown except when needed for clarity): 
PREMIUM = α0 + α1DISRUPT + α2aDISRUPT × ROA_T +α2bDISRUPT × BV_T  
+ α3aROA_T + α3bBV_T + α4MULTIBID + α5CASH + α6LIQUIDITY  




PREMIUM is the ratio of deal value to target market value four weeks prior to merger 
announcement date; 
 
DISRUPT = OP_ACQ or DR_INDEX; 
 





DR_INDEX is an index variable—comprised of the four subvariables: target management 
turnover, target analyst turnover, anticipated restructuring cost, and distance between acquirer 
and target headquarters—for which a value of 0 (1) is indicative of the least (most) disruption; 
 
ROA_T is a target’s industry-adjusted return on assets measured one year before the merger 
announcement year; 
 
BV_T is target net assets divided by target market value measured four weeks prior to merger 
announcement date; 
 
MULTIBID is an indicator variable equal to one if the number of acquirers bidding on a target 
is greater than one, and zero otherwise; 
 
CASH is an indicator variable equal to one if the deal was financed 100% with cash, and zero 
otherwise; 
 
LIQUIDITY is a target’s current assets minus current liabilities divided by book value of 
equity measured one year before the merger announcement; 
 
LEVERAGE is a target’s long-term debt divided by book value of equity measured one year 
before the merger announcement; 
 
MTB is a target’s market value divided by book value of equity measured one year before the 
merger announcement; 
 
PUBLICACQ is an indicator variable equal to one if the acquirer is a public firm, and zero 
otherwise. 
 
Because the denominator of the premium is the target’s pre-merger stock price, the 
coefficients on the accounting inputs capture the average difference between acquirers’ and the 
market’s valuation of these inputs. An insignificant coefficient on an accounting input indicates no 
average difference between acquirers’ valuation of the input and the market’s pre-merger valuation 
of the input. By contrast a positive (negative) coefficient on the accounting input indicates that 
acquirers assign a premium (discount) to the accounting input relative to the market’s pre-merger 
valuation. Accordingly, the coefficient on ROA_T captures the extent to which the acquirer values 
the target’s recent earnings (scaled by assets) at a premium or discount relative to the market’s pre-
merger valuation when disruption is minimal (i.e., when DISRUPT equals zero) while the coefficient 
on the interaction of ROA_T and DISRUPT captures the incremental premium or discount acquirers 
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assign to the target’s recent earnings as disruption increases. H1 predicts that the target’s recent 
earnings are less important to acquirers as anticipated disruption increases (i.e., α2a < 0). The 
coefficient on BV_T captures the extent to which the acquirer values the target’s book value at a 
premium or discount relative to the market’s pre-merger valuation when disruption is minimal (i.e., 
when DISRUPT equals zero) while the coefficient on the interaction of BV_T and DISRUPT captures 
the incremental premium or discount acquirers assign to the target’s book value as disruption 
increases. H2 predicts that the target’s book value becomes more important to acquirers as anticipated 
disruption increases (i.e., α2b > 0).  
I include MULTIBID to control for the positive effect of the number of competing acquirers 
on bid premium (Walkling and Edmister, 1985). I include CASH to control for valuation effects. On 
one hand, prior studies find that cash payments are positively associated with target bid premium 
because cash payments are often only used when the acquirer is more confident in the success of the 
merger and would like to retain the future positive returns to the existing shareholders (Abhyankar et 
al., 2005; Travlos, 1987). On the other hand, Louis (2004) finds no statistical difference between 
premiums paid by stock-for-stock acquirers and cash acquirers. Jensen (1986)’s free cash flow theory 
suggests that large free cash flows occur in poorly run firms and that acquirers have more to gain by 
acquiring highly liquid targets. On the other hand, Schwert (2000) does not find any evidence 
consistent with this prediction. Therefore, I include the control variable, LIQUIDITY, but do not 
predict a direction. Following Skaife and Wangerin (2013), I also include control variables, such as 
LEVERAGE and MTB, meant to capture target firm operating and financial risk that may increase 
or decrease premia. Finally, I include PUBLICACQ based on prior research that finds public acquirers 
to generally pay more than private acquirers for targets (Bargeron et al., 2008), and year and four-
digit SIC code industry fixed effects to control for systematic differences in merger premia over time 
and across industries.  
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3.3 Regression model for test of H3 
I examine the relative importance of target earnings quality in setting merger premia by 
estimating the following regression (firm and time subscripts are not shown except when needed for 
clarity): 
PREMIUM = α0 + α1DISRUPT + α2aDISRUPT × ROA_T + α2bDISRUPT × BV_T  
+ α2cDISRUPT × EQ_T + α3aROA_T + α3bBV_T + α3cEQ_T +  
+ α4MULTIBID + α5CASH + α6LIQUIDITY + α7LEVERAGE + α8MTB 
+ α9PUBLICACQ + δYEAR + λINDUSTRY + ε                        (2) 
where:  
EQ_T = EQ1 or EQ2; 
 
EQ1 is the target’s earnings quality measured per the Kothari et al. (2005) performance-
adjusted discretionary total accruals method; 
 
EQ2 is the target’s earnings quality measured per the Dechow and Dichev (2002) accruals 
quality method; 
 
and all other variables are as defined previously.  
 
The coefficient on EQ_T captures the extent to which an acquirer values a target’s recent 
earnings quality at a premium or discount relative to the market’s pre-merger valuation when 
disruption is minimal (i.e., when DISRUPT equals zero). The coefficient on the interaction of EQ_T 
and DISRUPT captures the incremental premium or discount acquirers assign to the target’s recent 
earnings quality as disruption increases. H3 predicts that the target’s recent earnings quality is less 
important to acquirers as anticipated disruption increases (i.e., α2c < 0). 
I use two alternative measures of earnings quality. The first is the magnitude of a target’s 
performance-adjusted discretionary total accruals measured at the end of the fiscal year immediately 
preceding the merger announcement (Kothari et al., 2005). I estimate targets’ expected accruals by 
running the following regression by two-digit SIC industry, j, to obtain industry-specific estimates 




     TAi,t = α0 + α1(1/Ai,t-1) + α2ΔREVi,t + α3PPEi,t + εi,t         (3) 
where: 
TAi,t is total accruals defined as the change in non-cash current assets minus the change in 
current liabilities excluding the portion of long-term debt, minus depreciation and 
amortization for firm i in year t, with TA scaled by Ai,t; 
 
Ai,t is the average of year t and year t -1 assets for firm i; 
ΔREVi,t  is the change in net revenues for firm i in year t, scaled by Ai,t; 
 PPEi,t  is gross property, plant, and equipment for firm i in year t, scaled by Ai,t. 
These annual cross-sectional estimations yield firm- and year-specific residuals that represent a firm’s 
discretionary accrual for a particular year. Like Skaife and Wangerin (2013), I form ten portfolios for 
each two-digit SIC industry group based on the decile rankings of the prior year return on assets 
(ROA). Performance-adjusted discretionary accruals are defined as the negative of the absolute value 
of unadjusted discretionary accruals calculated at the end of the fiscal year immediately preceding the 
merger announcement, year t-1, minus the matched median discretionary accrual for each ROA-decile 
portfolio.  
The second measure of earnings quality, based on the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model, 
measures accruals quality as the standard deviation of residuals from the following model: 
 
ACCi,t = α0 + α1CFOi,t-1 + α2CFOi,t + α3CFOi,t+1 + α4ΔREVi,t + α5PPEi,t + εt                    (4) 
where: 
ACCi,t is firm i’s accruals in year t measured as the change in non-cash current assets minus 
the change in current liabilities plus the portion of long-term debt, minus depreciation and 
amortization; 
 
 CFOi,t is firm i’s cash flow from operations in year t;  
and all other variables are as defined previously. 
I extend the Dechow-Dichev model by including the control variables ΔREVt and PPEt, per 
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McNichols (2002). All variables are standardized by average total assets and winsorized at the 1st and 
99th percentiles for each year. 
 To obtain a firm-specific, cross-sectional measure of accruals quality, I estimate equation (4) 
for each year at the industry (two-digit SIC code) level, where the annual cross-sectional estimations 
yield firm- and year-specific residuals. This procedure is consistent with Raman et al. (2012) and 
McNichols and Stubben (2012).8 Consistent with Aboody et al.’s (2005) third measure, I compute 
earnings quality (EQ2) for target i in year t as the absolute value of a firm’s residual at the end of the 
fiscal year immediately preceding the merger announcement. I focus on the absolute value of residuals 
instead of the standard deviation of residuals over time because targets tend to be younger firms with 
only a few years of publicly available financial information. 
3.4 Regression model for test of H4 
H4 predicts that there is a greater risk of goodwill impairments due either to overpayment or 
poor execution when acquirers do not vary the weight they place on targets' accounting inputs based 
on disruption as predicted in H1 - H3.  Because equation (2) models predicted pricing behavior, 
residuals from equation (2), which I label RESIDUAL, represent deviations from predicted pricing 
behavior. I estimate the following regression to determine whether these deviations are associated 
with a heightened risk of goodwill impairments (firm and time subscripts are not shown except when 
needed for clarity): 
Pr (GW_IMPAIR = 1) = logit (α0+ α1RESIDUAL + α2ΔSALES + α3ΔOCF + α4LEVERAGE  
+ α5SIZE + α6NUMSEG+ α7BTM_IND + α8BHRET + α9RANK  
+ α10BONUS + α11BATH + α12TENURE + α13GW% + δYEAR + ε                   (5) 
 
where:  
GW_IMPAIR is an indicator variable equal to one if the acquiring firm reported a goodwill 
impairment within three years of the merger, zero otherwise; 
 
                                                          
8 I further require at least 20 firms in year t to estimate the industry-level regressions. 
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ΔSALES is the change of sales from year t-1 to year t divided by total assets in year t-1; 
 
ΔOCF is the change in cash flows from operations from year t-1 to year t divided by total 
assets in year t-1; 
 
LEVERAGE is the long-term debt divided by book value of equity measured at year t; 
 
SIZE is the natural log of the market value in year t; 
 
NUMSEG is the natural log of 1 + the number of reporting segments at year t; 
 
BTM_IND is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm has a ratio of market value 
divided by book value of equity greater than one, zero otherwise; 
 
BHRET is the buy-and-hold return for fiscal year t; 
 
RANK is the insample rank of cash plus all investments and advance minus debt and 
preferred equity divided by total assets minus liabilities in year t; 
 
BONUS is an indicator variable equal to one if the CEO receives a cash bonus in year t; 
 
BATH is an indicator variable equal to one if the change in the pre-goodwill impairment net 
income from year t-1 to t falls below the median of all negative values, zero otherwise; 
 
TENURE is the tenure in years of the CEO in year t; 
 
GW% is the balance of goodwill in year t-1 divided by total assets in year t-2; 
 
I predict that as RESIDUAL increases (i.e. as acquirers' pricing decisions conform less with 
that predicted in H1 and H2), the likelihood of future goodwill impairments increases (α1 > 0).  
Leading indicators of goodwill impairment mirror the leading indicators of a company’s 
ability to survive. These indicators include recurring operating losses, negative working capital and 
cash flows from operating activities and financial ratios that capture financial health (Hayn and 
Hughes, 2005). Consistent with prior research, I include variables that capture these dimensions such 
as ΔSALES and ΔOCF. As per Wangerin (2012), I include LEV to capture the closeness to debt 
violation. Prior research shows that as initial flexibility of allocating goodwill increases, the later 
likelihood of a goodwill impairment decreases (Ramanna and Watts, 2012). A greater number of 
reporting units is associated with greater flexibility, because managers have more allocation options, 
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so I include NUMSEG. BTM_IND and BHRET proxy for the economic necessity of a write-off. Prior 
research predicts that higher BTM ratios indicate higher likelihood of goodwill write-offs, since 
growth opportunities are relatively low (Wangerin, 2012; Beatty and Weber, 2006). Similarly, higher 
levels of BHRET reflects the market’s favorable assessment of the firm’s value and growth 
opportunities and is negatively related to the likelihood of goodwill impairments. Firms with net 
assets that are more unverifiable are more likely to take a goodwill write-off (Ramanna and Watts, 
2012), so I include RANK. Ramanna and Watts (2012) and Beatty and Weber (2006) argue that 
reputational and compensation concerns limit manager’s interests in taking goodwill write-offs, so I 
include TENURE and BONUS. I also control for “big bath” reporting incentives and include BATH. 
Finally, I include GW% to reflect the increased likelihood of goodwill impairment. 
A limitation in my use of equation (5) to test H4 is that the deviations from predicted behavior 
represented by the residuals from equation (2) are not necessarily attributable to disruption. To better 
isolate the deviation that is specifically related to disruption, I estimate the following variant of 
equation (2) that excludes DISRUPT and its interactions with the accounting inputs. 
 
PREMIUM = α0 + α1 ROA_T + α2 BV_T + α3 EQ_T + α4 MULTIBID + α5 CASH  
+ α6LIQUIDITY + α7LEVERAGE + α8MTB + α9PUBLICACQ  
+ δYEAR + λINDUSTRY + ε                  (2′) 
 
All variables are as defined previously. 
I substitute the residual from equation (2') in equation 4, RESIDUAL’. I compare the model 
fit of equation (4) when estimated using the residual from equation (2) versus the residual from 
equation (2'). Since the only difference between equations (2) and (2') is whether DISRUPT and the 
related interactions are included, this comparison allows me to isolate the portion of the deviation that 
is due to improper weight on disruption. I compare model fit using the Bayesian information criterion 
(BIC) and Akaike information criterion (AIC). Given any two estimated models, the model with the 
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lower BIC and AIC is the better fitting one (Schwarz, 1978; Akaike, 1974)9. A finding that the 
residual from the full model that includes disruption (equation (2)) provides a better fit for equation 
(4) than the residual from the model that excludes disruption (equation (2′)) suggests that improper 
attention to disruption contributes to any relation I document between RESIDUAL and the likelihood 
of subsequent goodwill impairments. 
3.5 Regression model for test of H5 
Goodman et al. (2014) document a negative relation between the acquirer's management 
forecast accuracy and the likelihood of subsequent goodwill impairment. To examine how 
disruption affects this relation, I estimate the following logit regression (firm and time subscripts are 
not shown except when needed for clarity): 
Pr(GW_IMPAIR = 1) = logit (α0+ α1DR_LO + α2FORACC_HI+ α3DR_LO × FORACC_HI  
+ α4ΔSALES + α5ΔOCF + α6LEV + α7SIZE + α8NUMSEG+ α9BTM_IND 
+ α10BHRET + α11RANK + α12BONUS + α13BATH + α14TENURE + α15GW% 
+ δYEAR + ε )               (6) 
where: 
DR_LO is an indicator variable equal to one if DR_INDEX is equal to 0 or .25, zero if 
DR_INDEX is equal to .5, .75 or 1. 
FORACC_HI is an indicator variable equal to one if the management forecast accuracy is 
above the sample median, zero otherwise. 
All variables are ad defined previously. 
Consistent with Goodman et al. (2014), I calculate forecast accuracy as the average accuracy 
for all annual forecasts issued in the three-year period before the merger announcement. Accuracy is 
measured as the absolute value of the difference between the manager’s EPS forecast and actual 
                                                          
9 The AIC and BIC are used extensively in the literature for both nested and non-nested model selection (Cremers, 
2002; Pesaran and Timmermann, 1995; Bossaerts and Hillion, 1999). Both criteria are measures of the quality of a 
statistical model of a given dataset relative to other statistical models of the same dataset. Like the adjusted-R2, both 
criteria include a penalty term for the number of parameters in the model. Furthermore, both criteria are based on the 
likelihood function of a statistical model and penalize for unexplained variation in the dependent variable. Hence, a 
lower AIC (BIC) implies either fewer explanatory variables, better fit, or both. However, neither criteria provides any 
information about the absolute quality of the model (i.e., if all models are poor fit to the data, neither AIC or BIC will 
provide any indication of this).  
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EPS scaled by the beginning of year stock price. I then multiply the average three-year forecast 
accuracy by negative one so that an increase in forecast accuracy corresponds to an increase in 
accuracy. 
A finding of α2 < 0 is consistent with evidence in Goodman et al. (2014). As discussed in 
section 2.5, this negative relation may vary based on disruption but how the relation varies depends 
on which source of management forecast accuracy drives Goodman et al.'s (2014) finding. The 
coefficient on the interaction of DR_LO and FORACC_HI captures how the negative relation varies 





Chapter 4: Sample 
4.1 Sample overview 
I use two samples that correspond to the different data requirements associated with the two 
approaches to measuring disruption. The sample I use when measuring disruption using the financial 
versus operating acquirer distinction (hereafter, the financial-operating sample) consists of 
transactions involving financial acquirers and a matched set of transactions involving operating 
acquirers. The sample I use when measuring disruption using the disruption index (hereafter, the 
operating only sample) consists entirely of transactions involving operating acquirers. 
4.1.1  Sample selection procedures for the financial-operating sample 
I first search the SDC online database for completed mergers announced between January 1, 
1980 and December 31, 2010 that involve financial acquirers and meet the following criteria: (1) the 
target is publicly traded in the United States; (2) the acquirer is a financial firm (SIC codes between 
6000 and 6999) but not a creditor group; (3) the target is not a financial firm; (4) the acquirer 
purchases 100% of the target’s shares; and (5) relevant financial accounting information for the target 
is not missing. Although I include both public and private acquirers in the sample, due to the need for 
publicly available accounting information, I focus exclusively on publicly traded target firms. 
Because traditional profitability measures are not comparable between financial firms and firms in 
other industries, I exclude financial target firms, which thereby limits the possibility that my sample 
includes financial acquirers seeking operating synergies.10 These procedures, summarized in Panel A 
of Table 1, yield 120 transactions involving 113 unique acquirers. 
[Insert Table 1] 
                                                          
10 Because financial acquirers may pursue operational synergies by merging with other financial-related targets, to 
increase the likelihood that a merger with a financial acquirer will entail relatively minimal disruption of target 
operations, I consider only mergers between operating targets and financial acquirers. 
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I next identify a matched sample of transactions involving operating company acquirers.11 
Identifying targets as economically similar as possible to the targets in the financial company sample 
helps to ensure that any differences between the samples in the use of accounting information for 
merger valuation can be attributed to the type of acquirer. I use the following criteria to identify 
matches:  (1) target four-digit SIC code industry membership, (2) announced year of merger, (3) net 
target asset size measured the year before the merger, and (4) target return on assets measured the 
year before the merger. After identifying target firms based on four-digit SIC code industry 
membership, I identify potential target matches by further limiting the control sample to merger 
announcement dates that fall within two years of the merger announcement date of the treatment 
(financial acquirer) group. I next eliminate target matches for which net target assets are more than 
200% and less than 50% of the treatment target’s net assets.12  For the set of potential targets that 
meet these criteria, I choose the target closest in terms of the treatment target’s return on assets. 
4.1.2 Sample selection procedures for the operating only sample 
I select from the SDC online database mergers and acquisitions announced between January 
1, 199413 and December 31, 2010 that meet the following criteria: (1) the acquirer and target are 
publicly traded in the United States; (2) the target is not a financial firm (SIC codes between 6000 
and 6999); (3) relevant financial accounting information is available for both target and acquirer; (4) 
the acquirer has no pre-existing toehold in the target; and (5) the value of the target is at least 50% 
but no greater than 100% of the value of the acquirer. Due to the need for publicly available 
                                                          
11 I use a matched-sample design technique because prior research has found the targets of private equity firms are 
inherently different than targets of public operating firms (Bargeron et al., 2008). Kernal density estimation graphs show 
the probability density function of size and ROA of operating targets of financial and non-financial acquirers to be 
significantly different. According to Rubin (1979), a matching procedure is preferred to a regression framework when 
there is an imbalance of the covariates. Other papers that employ the same technique include Song and Walkling (1993) 
and Bris et al. (2008). 
12 Hadlock et al. (1999) use a similar matching criterion. For their sample, the restriction regarding target asset size 
ranged from no more than 200% and no less than 50% of the assets of the actual target. 
13 Public SEC filings are available beginning in 1994; restructuring cost information used to measure disruption is 
gleaned from annual reports. 
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accounting information, I focus exclusively on publicly traded firms. I impose a minimum deal ratio 
requirement to ensure that the target is material to the combined firm, and eliminate transactions in 
which acquirers have a pre-merger equity stake in the target to avoid confounding effects in my 
analyses. Consistent with Raman et al. (2012), I exclude transactions in which the bid premium is less 
than the target’s pre-merger market value because interpretation is problematic. These procedures 
yield 322 merger transactions. As explained above, I use four variables, including target analyst and 
target management turnover, to measure disruption in target operations. I eliminated 134 targets with 
either no pre-merger analyst following or no available information on management turnover. The 
final sample consists of 188 merger transactions. See Panel B of Table 1 for sample selection 
procedures. 
4.2 Descriptive statistics for the operating-financial sample 
  Panel A of Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the entire operating-financial sample as 
well as separate statistics for the financial acquirer and operating acquirer target subsamples. Since I 
match each operating target of a financial acquirer to another operating target of an operating acquirer 
along four dimensions (see Section 4.1.1), it is not surprising that there are almost no significant 
differences between the two samples. A few differences are, however, noteworthy. First, I find the 
targets of financial acquirers to be significantly less liquid than the targets of operating acquirers, and 
mergers with financial acquirers to be more frequently financed with cash. These findings are 
consistent with prior findings that targets of financial acquirers are financially constrained and need 
access to financial resources in order to grow (Weston et al., 2004). I further find that financial 
acquirers are significantly more likely than operating acquirers to be private companies. More than 
75% of financial acquirers are private equity firms (not tabulated). 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
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  Panel B of Table 2 provides some description of the industries represented by two-digit SIC 
codes. Before the merger, approximately 42% of targets operated in services, 23% in manufacturing, 
and 11% in transportation industries. Similar proportions are observed among operating acquirers, 
36% of which operated in services, 30% in manufacturing, and 12% in transportation industries. 
 Panel A of Table 3 reports correlations, which, for the most part, reflect the findings in Table 
2. I do find, however, a negative correlation between operating acquirer status and targets’ historical 
ROA. Although I match each operating target of a financial acquirer to an operating target of an 
operating acquirer based on historical ROA (the fourth criterion in the matching process; see Section 
4.1.1), targets of operating acquirers tend to be less profitable before the merger, and a close match 
on this dimension is difficult to find. The relationship is, however, consistent with my expectation 
that operating acquirers find targets’ historical earnings performance less relevant in determining bid 
price.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
4.3 Descriptive statistics for the operating only sample 
Panel C of Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the operating only sample. Consistent with 
prior research, target analyst and target management turnover rates are high after mergers (Martin and 
McConnell, 1991; Tehranian et al., 2013). In my sample, approximately 60% of target CEOs leave 
within two years of a merger and approximately 50% of target firms experience 100% analyst 
turnover. The financial characteristics of targets in my sample are also consistent with prior literature. 
The average market-to-book (MTB) ratio of 2.82, for example, is consistent with target firm ratios 
reported by Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) and Skaife and Wangerin (2013), and leverage and liquidity 
rates are consistent with those reported by Skaife and Wangerin (2013) and Raman et al. (2012), 
respectively. 
Panel B of Table 3 documents correlations. PREMIUM is significantly negatively correlated 
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with CASH, LIQUIDITY, LEVERAGE, and MTB and positively related to BV_T, TATO, and MTO. 
With the exception of CASH, these negative correlations are consistent with prior literature. The 
negative correlation with CASH may be due to my sample including only public acquirers, whereas 
previous samples include both private and public acquirers.  
4.4 Descriptive statistics for post-merger acquirers 
 Panel D of Table 2 reports post-merger descriptive statistics for a subsample of the operating 
acquirers reported in Panel C of Table 2. Operating acquirers reported in Panel C are reported in 
Panel D if the required financial accounting information to examine goodwill impairment is 
available on COMPUSTAT within any of the three years after the effective date of the merger. Out 
of the 287 unique operating acquirers reported in Panel C of Table 2, 141 of them are included in 
Panel D (not tabulated).  In my sample, approximately 29 % of acquirers take at least one goodwill 
impairment within the three years of the merger (not tabulated).  
 Panel C of Table 3 documents correlations for these operating acquirers. GW_IMPAIR is 
significantly positively correlated with GW%, BHRET and BTM_IND and negatively related to 
BONUS and FORACC_HI. These correlations are consistent with prior literature. Correlations 





Chapter 5: Empirical Findings 
5.1 Hypotheses 1 and 2 
  Panel A of Table 4 reports the results of estimating equation (1) on the sample consisting of 
transactions involving both financial and operating acquirers. I include several specifications to show 
the stability of the coefficients of interest, but for brevity discuss the results from estimating the full 
model (Specification 4). The insignificant coefficients on ROA_T and BV_T indicate that there is no 
average difference between acquirers’ valuation of these inputs and the market’s pre-merger valuation 
of these inputs when disruption is minimal. The coefficient on the interaction term, OP_ACQ × 
ROA_T, is significantly negative across all specifications (coefficient = -0.07, p-value < 0.10), which 
is consistent with H1. This finding indicates that, relative to financial acquirers, operating acquirers 
discount the information in the target’s past earnings, presumably because the information the target’s 
past earnings conveys about its pre-merger operations is less important to acquirers that anticipate 
disrupting those operations.  
 [Insert Table 4]  
The coefficient on the interaction term, OP_ACQ × BV_T, is significantly positive across all 
specifications (coefficient = 0.38, p-value < 0.01), which is consistent with H2. This finding indicates 
that operating acquirers place significantly more weight on the target’s book value than do financial 
acquirers, presumably because the information the target’s recent book value conveys about the 
adaptation value of its resources is more important to acquirers that plan to disrupt the target’s 
operations.  
 Given that Bhojraj et al. (2003) find GIC classifications to be significantly better than SIC 
codes at explaining cross-sectional variation in key financial ratios, I replicate the preceding analysis 
by matching, based on GIC codes, operating targets of financial acquirers to operating targets of 
operating acquirers. Panel B of Table 4 reports the results of this analysis, which corroborate those 
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reported in Panel A of Table 4. The increase in the number of observations is attributable to the greater 
number of matching pairs that result from the broader GIC classification scheme. 
Table 5 reports the results of estimating equation (1) on the sample consisting only of 
transactions involving operating acquirers. Because premium determination may differ between 
same-industry versus cross-industry deals (Raman et al., 2012; Skaife and Wangerin, 2013), I also 
include an indicator variable, IND, set equal to one if the acquirer and target operate in the same two-
digit SIC code before the merger and zero otherwise. For brevity, I discuss the results from estimating 
the full model (Specification 3). The coefficient on the interaction term, DR_INDEX × ROA_T, is 
significantly negative across all specifications (coefficient = -0.17, p-value = 0.02), which provides 
further evidence in support of H1. This finding indicates that operating acquirers discount the 
information in the target’s past earnings as disruption increases, presumably because the information 
the target’s past earnings conveys about its pre-merger operations is less important to acquirers that 
anticipate disrupting those operations. The coefficient on the interaction term, DR_INDEX × BV_T, 
is significantly positive across all specifications (coefficient = 1.03, p-value = 0.01), which provides 
further support for H2. 
[Insert Table 5] 
With respect to the control variables, the signs and significance of most of the coefficients are 
consistent with prior literature.  However, the negative sign on MULTIBID is not consistent with 
prior literature but this is mainly due to the lack of variation of multibids in the sample. More than 
90% of the merger deals in the sample involve only one bidder. 
Taken collectively, the results support my prediction that the relevance of the target’s 
historical accounting information depends on the degree of anticipated disruption. The results also 
highlight the circumstances under which the target’s historical earnings and book values are relatively 
more important in the merger setting. 
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5.2 Hypothesis 3 
Table 6 reports the results of estimating equation (2) on the sample consisting of transactions 
involving both financial and operating acquirers. The decrease in the number of observations is due 
to the additional data requirements for computing the earnings quality measures. The coefficient on 
the interaction term, OP_ACQ × EQ_T, is significantly negative for the earnings quality measure 
based on Kothari et al. (2005), (coefficient = -1.88, p-value = 0.02), which is consistent with H3 and 
suggests that operating acquirers discount the contribution of high earnings quality to precise 
information about the target’s existing operations because operating acquirers do not intend for such 
operations to continue. I obtain similar albeit weaker inferences when I measure earnings quality 
using the Dechow and Dichev (2002) methodology (coefficient = -1.72, p-value = 0.10). 
This result is consistent with the negative relation between merger premium and earnings 
quality documented in prior studies (Skaife and Wangerin, 2013; Raman et al., 2012; McNichols and 
Stubben, 2012). As discussed previously, Skaife and Wangerin (2013) interpret the negative relation 
as an indication that acquirers of targets with low earnings quality have identified, and are willing to 
pay for, sources of value of the target that are not well reflected in either the target’s pre-merger 
earnings performance or its stock price. My finding that this negative relation becomes more 
pronounced as disruption increases suggests that the previous finding is attributable primarily to 
acquirers anticipating significant disruption. 
[Insert Table 6] 
Table 7 reports the results of estimating equation (2) on the sample that consists only of 
operating acquirers. Again, the decrease in the number of observations is due to the additional data 
requirements for computing the earnings quality measures. The coefficient on the interaction term, 
DR_INDEX × EQ_T, is significantly negative for the earnings quality measure based on Kothari et 
al. (2005), (coefficient = -6.55, p-value = 0.03), providing further support for H3. I obtain similar 
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inferences when I measure earnings quality using the Dechow and Dichev (2002) methodology 
(coefficient = -5.94, p-value = 0.07).  
[Insert Table 7] 
Collectively, these results support the prediction that earnings quality varies in importance 
based on acquirer intent. Specifically, acquirers that intend to disrupt target operations appear to 
discount the information earnings quality conveys about a target’s pre-merger operations. 
5.3 Hypothesis 4 
 Table 8 reports the result of estimating equation (5) on the sample that consists only of 
operating acquirers. I do not analyze the data on the sample consisting of transactions involving both 
financial and operating acquirers because I need publicly available information for the acquirer to 
examine post-merger goodwill impairment occurrence. The decrease in the number of observations 
from H1 – H3 is due to the additional data requirements for computing the control variables related 
to goodwill impairment. In the first specification, the coefficient on RESIDUAL is significantly 
positive (coefficient = 3.91, p-value = 0.05), which is consistent with H4 and suggests that as 
acquirers’ pricing decisions conform less with predicted pricing behavior as modeled in equation (2), 
the likelihood of future goodwill impairments increases.  
 To examine whether the deviation from predicted pricing behavior represented by 
RESIDUAL is specifically related to disruption, I report a second specification that includes the 
residual from equation (2’), RESIDUAL’. First, I find that the coefficient on RESIDUAL’ is not 
significantly positive (coefficient = .68, p-value 0.38), which suggests that the residual from the model 
that excludes disruption does not significantly explain subsequent goodwill impairments. Second, I 
find that the BIC and AIC for the full model that includes disruption is lower, and hence a better fit 
for the data, than the residual from the model that excludes disruption. This finding suggests that 
improper attention to disruption contributes to the significant positive relation that I document in the 
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first specification between RESIDUAL and the likelihood of subsequent goodwill impairments. 
Collectively, these results support the prediction that the likelihood of post-merger goodwill 
impairment increases when acquirers do not vary the weight they placed on the target’s accounting 
inputs based on anticipated disruption of the target’s existing operations. 
[Insert Table 8] 
5.4 Hypothesis 5 
Table 9 reports the result of estimating equation (6) on the sample that consists only of 
operating acquirers. Again, I do not analyze the data on the sample consisting of transactions 
involving both financial and operating acquirers because I need publicly available information for the 
acquirer to examine the relationship between post-merger goodwill impairment occurrence and 
management forecasts.  In the first specification, I report results consistent with Goodman et al. (2014) 
and find that the coefficient on FORACC_HI is significantly negative (coefficient = -1.07, p-value = 
0.09).  In the second specification, I find that the coefficient on the interaction term, DR_LO × 
FORACC_HI, is significantly negative, (coefficient = -4.78, p-value = 0.01), which is consistent with 
H5 and suggests that disruption affects the relation between the acquirer’s management forecast 
accuracy and the likelihood of subsequent goodwill impairment. Furthermore, I find that if disruption 
is high (DR_LO = 0), then the significantly negative relation between FORACC_HI and subsequent 
goodwill impairment is less pronounced (coefficient = -.22, p-value = 0.82). These findings suggest 
that the negative relation between management forecast accuracy and subsequent goodwill 
impairments, as documented by Goodman et al. (2014), is driven by managers’ ability to properly use 
past earnings to predict future earnings. 
[Insert Table 9] 
5.5 Supplemental analysis 
As discussed above, the results I report are robust to the use of alternative measures of 
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earnings quality, and to matching operating targets of financial acquirers to operating targets of 
operating acquirers based on GIC rather than SIC codes. As an additional robustness test, I measure 
earnings performance as a target’s change in ROA measured the fiscal year immediately preceding 
the merger announcement. Table 10 reports the results of this additional analysis. When disruption 
is measured based on the financial versus operating acquirer distinction (i.e., when DISRUPT = 
OP_ACQ), the coefficient on DISRUPT × ΔROA_T is negative and marginally significant 
(coefficient = -0.07, p-value = 0.10). This finding corroborates the results reported in Table 4. The 
slightly weaker results are likely due to the smaller number of observations resulting from the need 
for an additional year of data to calculate the change in ROA. When disruption is measured based 
on the disruption index (i.e., when DISRUPT = DR_INDEX), the coefficient on DISRUPT × 
ΔROA_T is negative and strongly significant (coefficient = -0.63, p-value < 0.01), consistent with 
the inferences in Table 5. 







Chapter 6: Summary and Conclusions 
In this study, I examine the effect of disruption of target operations on the relevance of the 
target’s historical accounting information in merger pricing. Historical earnings information is 
traditionally used to value firms on a stand-alone basis due to the ability of past earnings to predict 
future earnings via earnings persistence (Sloan, 1996; Ou and Penman, 1989; Bernard and Thomas, 
1990; Fairfield and Yohn, 2001). However, in the merger context where the acquirer must value the 
target based on its anticipated use of the target, the predictive ability of historical earnings may be 
undermined if the acquirer intends to disrupt the target’s underlying operations, and hence, earnings 
generating process. On the other hand, if the merger’s source of the value comes from disruption of 
the target’s underlying operations, acquirers may find the target’s book value useful to the extent that 
it reflects adaptation value, or the value of the firm’s resources independent of how well the firm 
utilizes those resources. Therefore, I expect the relevance of the target’s historical accounting 
information for merger pricing to vary with the anticipated degree of disruption. 
 I use the financial versus operating acquirer distinction to measure anticipated disruption in 
target operations based on prior research that finds that financial firms generally pursue mergers to 
exploit financial-related benefits that do not significantly alter targets’ operations, whereas operating 
firms are more likely to seek merger gains that require adapting and/or redeploying target resources. 
I find that operating, relative to financial, acquirers discount target historical earnings and earnings 
quality in setting merger premia. On the other hand, I find that operating acquirers place greater 
weight than financial acquirers on target book value, which indicates that target adaptation value as 
reflected in book value is of greater interest to operating than to financial acquirers. 
I examine cross-sectional variation in the relevance of target historical accounting information 
in mergers involving operating acquirers by creating an index that captures the anticipated degree of 
disruption. Consistent with my previous results, I find that operating acquirers discount target 
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historical earnings and earnings quality to a greater degree, and place greater weight on target book 
value, as the level of disruption increases. These findings lend further support to the conclusion that 
the relevance of target historical accounting information depends on the anticipated degree of 
disruption. 
To extend my main findings, I examine post-merger consequences related to disruption. First, 
I assess whether there are economic consequences when acquirers ignore disruption in their pricing 
decisions. I predict and find that the likelihood of post-merger goodwill impairment increases when 
acquirers do not vary the weight they placed on the target’s accounting inputs (earnings, book value 
and earnings quality) based on anticipated disruption of the target’s existing operations. Second, I 
examine how manager’s ability to forecast merger performance varies by disruption. Goodman et al. 
(2014) argue that managers’ general forecasting ability as reflected in their publicly released 
management forecasts translates into the ability to make the necessary forecasts for investments such 
as mergers and acquisitions. I argue and find that this relationship varies based on disruption and 
provide evidence that suggests that managers who make more accurate earnings forecasts are better 
able to assess external projects due to their ability to properly use past earnings to predict future 
earnings. Collectively, these findings provide important insights into the conditions under which 
particular types of accounting information are most useful in the merger context.    
This study adds to an emerging literature on the role of accounting information in target 
valuation. I provide evidence that the importance of target historical accounting information varies 
with the degree of disruption, which should be relevant to acquirers that must determine the 
appropriate degree of reliance on historical target accounting information in formulating their bids, 
























An indicator variable equal to one if DR_INDEX is equal to 0 or .25, zero if DR_INDEX is 
equal to .5, .75 or 1.
An indicator variable equal to one if the management forecast accuracy is above the sample 
median, zero otherwise.
An indicator variable equal to one if the CEO receives a cash bonus in year t.
The natural log of 1 + the number of reporting segments at year t.
The buy-and-hold return for fiscal year t.
An indicator variable equal to one if the number of bidders bidding on the target is greater 
than one, zero otherwise. 
Earnings quality measured per the Dechow and Dichev (2002) accruals quality method.
An indicator variable equal to one if the change in the pre-goodwill impairment net income 
from year t-1 to t falls below the median of all negative values, zero otherwise.
The balance of goodwill in year t-1 divided by total assets in year t-2.
An indicator variable equal to one if the firm has a ratio of market value divided by book 
value of equity greater than one, zero otherwise.
An indicator variable equal to one if the target CEO left the merged firm within two years 
after the merger, zero otherwise.
Appendix A
An indicator variable equal to one if the acquirer and target operate in the same two-digit 
industry before the merger, zero otherwise. 
Variable Definitions
Definition
The target's net assets divided by the target's market value measured four weeks before the 
merger announcement date.
An indicator variable equal to one if the deal was financed with 100% cash, zero otherwise. 
The target's long term debt divided by book value of equity measured one year before the 
merger announcement.
An indicator variable equal to one if the acquiring firm reported a goodwill impairment 
within three years of the merger, zero otherwise.
An indicator variable equal to one if the distance between the acquirer's and target's 
headquarters is within 50 kilometers, zero otherwise. Distance is calculated using the 
Haversine formula. 
An index variable comprised of four subvariables meant to capture the disruption to the 
target's underlying assets. These four variables are target management turnover, target 
analyst turnover, anticipated restructuring costs, and the distance between the acquirer's and 
target's headquarters. A value of 0 (1) is indicative of the least (most) disruptive.
The absolute value of the difference between the actual and forecasted ROA two years after 
the effective year of merger.
Earnings quality per the Kothari et al (2005) performance-adjusted discretionary total 
accruals method.
The target's current assets minus current liabilities divided by book value of equity 
measured one year before the merger announcement.















The insample rank of cash plus all investments and advance minus debt and preferred equity 
divided by total assets minus liabilities in year t.
The log of the tenure in years of the CEO in year t.
The change of sales from year t-1 to year t divided by total assets in year t-1.
The change in cash flows from operations from year t-1 to year t divided by total assets in 
year t-1.
The natural log of the market value in year t.
An indicator variable equal to one if 100% of the analysts that were following the target 
before the merger decide not to follow the merged firm, zero otherwise.
The change in the target's industry-adjusted ROA one year before the merger announcement 
date. 
An indicator variable equal to one if the acquirer's anticipated merger restructuring expenses 
fall above the sample median, zero otherwise.
An indicator variable equal to one if the acquirer is a public firm, zero otherwise.
The ratio of the value of the transaction over the market value to the acquirer four weeks 
before the merger announcement.
The target's industry-adjusted return on assets one year before the announcement year of the 
merger.




Validation Test of Disruption Index 
 
I evaluate whether DR_INDEX captures anticipated disruption by examining the 
association between DR_INDEX and the extent to which the target’s pre-merger earnings 
generation process is maintained in the post-merger setting. Specifically, I test whether the stability 
of the autoregressive properties of the target’s earnings decreases as DR_INDEX increases. To 
calculate the stability of the autoregressive property of the target’s earnings, I first run a pooled 
regression on the following autoregressive model two years before the merger: 
      ROAt= α0 + α1ROAt-1 + εt            (5) 
where: 
ROAt is combined operating income of acquirer and target in year t / (combined net 
operating assets of acquirer and target in year t + mark-up in target assets at merger date);  
 
Mark-Up in Target assets = deal value - the book value of subsidiary net assets (only if 
transaction was accounted for under the purchase method).  
 
I simulate a hypothetical combined firm prior to the merger by combining the pre-merger earnings 
and net operating assets of the acquirer and target. I use these combined values to calculate pre-
merger values of ROA. Equation (1) is a simple first-order autocorrelation model used extensively 
in the forecasting literature (Ball and Watts, 1972; Watts and Leftwich, 1977) that directly tests 
the autoregressive properties I wish to examine. I estimate equation (5) on the pooled sample using 
data from two years before the merger for each transaction. I then apply the resulting parameter 
estimate to the realized values of ROA of the merged firm for the year after merger completion to 
predict future ROA for the second year after the merger. Due to the confounding effects of the 
one-time merger costs incurred during the year of merger, and partial year inclusion of the target’s 
earnings under the purchase method, I do not apply the parameter estimates to the ROA value of 
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the year of the merger (Healy et al., 1992; Hoberg and Phillips, 2010). For transactions accounted 
for under the purchase method, I adjust the pre-merger accounting numbers to incorporate the fair 
market value restatements. I determine the markup in subsidiary assets in the manner of Collins 
and Kim (2012) and Rau and Vermaelen (1998) by taking the difference between the deal value 
and book value of subsidiary net assets.1 I provide an example of how I compute the pre-merger 
ROA of the hypothetical entity in Appendix C. 
The accuracy of estimates based on the pre-merger time-series parameters provides an 
indication of the degree to which a merger disrupts or alters the earnings process and, hence, the 
degree to which assumptions of inter-temporal stability are applicable in the merger setting. 
Estimates based on pre-merger time-series parameters should be relatively more (less) accurate for 
mergers with less (more) disruption. I expect the forecast error to be increasing with disruption, as 
captured by DR_INDEX. 
Because univariate analysis of forecast errors does not take into account other merger-
specific factors that may explain variation in forecast errors, I run the following OLS regression 
to mitigate these concerns: 
FORCASTERRt+2 = α0 + α1DR_INDEX + α2RELSIZE + ∑ YEAR + ∑ INDUSTRY+ εt+2      (6)  
where: 
FORECASTERR is the absolute value of the difference between the actual and forecasted 
ROA two years after the effective year of merger, t, with predicted values determined by 
applying the coefficients from the regression of equation (5); 
 
DR_INDEX is a disruption variable that takes values from zero (least disruptive) to one 
(most disruptive);  
 
                                                          
1 Under the purchase method of accounting (ASC 805), the purchase price must be allocated to the target’s assets 
and liabilities at their FMV. Hence, under the purchase method, the acquirer adds the FMV of the target’s 
company’s assets to its balance sheet. Therefore, the difference between the purchase price and the target’s book 
value of net assets at the time of the merger represents the total markup in the target’s assets. Note that both 
goodwill and asset write-ups are included in this variable. See Appendix C for a detailed example. 
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RELSIZE is the ratio of the value of the transaction to the market value of the acquirer four 
weeks before the merger announcement. 
  
I include RELSIZE to control for larger (smaller) mergers that may cause more (less) 
disruption to acquirer operations. I predict that disruption, as captured by DR_INDEX, has a 
significantly positive relationship with forecast error (i.e., α1 > 0). 
I report the results in Table A1. I display the variables included in DR_INDEX separately 
to illustrate how each affects forecast accuracy two years after the merger. Consistent with my 
expectations, an increase in MTO, LOCAL, and RESCO is associated with a significantly positive 
increase in FORECASTERR. TATO, however, has no explanatory power with respect to post-
merger forecast accuracy. In the fifth specification, I include all variables to see if each captures a 
different dimension of disruption that explains forecast accuracy. As can be seen in Table A1, 
when each variable is included in one regression, LOCAL and MTO load positively (coefficient 
of 3.13 and 1.461, p-value <.01 and p-value <.10, respectively). I include in the last specification 
in Table A1 the main disruption variable, DR_INDEX.  As expected, DR_INDEX is significantly 
positively associated with an increase in FORECASTERR (coefficient of 6.048, p-value < .01).  
Across all specifications, the relative size of the target (RELSIZE) is an economically significant 
predictor of how well the autoregressive parameter for the pre-merger earnings of the hypothetical 
firm explains actual post-merger earnings. These results suggest that DR_INDEX is an effective 




Computation of Pre-Merger ROA Values 
In this appendix, I illustrate how I account for the mark-up in target assets following a 
merger in which the purchase method of accounting is used. Under the purchase method, the target 
firm is recorded on the acquirer’s book at the purchase price, which is assumed to be the fair market 
value of the entire entity acquired (ASC 805). As a result, the target’s fixed assets are stepped up 
to their fair market value. Furthermore, goodwill may be created if there is any difference between 
the purchase price and fair market value of the target’s identifiable assets. Therefore, the pre-
merger assets of a hypothetical entity comprised of both the acquirer and target will not 
automatically include the mark-up in the target’s assets. I address this problem by adding the mark-
up, defined as the difference between the deal value and the book value of subsidiary net assets, to 
the pre-merger assets of the hypothetical entity.  
Consider the merger between Lukens Inc, a steel plate manufacturer, and Bethlehem Steel 
Corporation, a steel and shipbuilder producer. On May 29, 1998, Bethlehem Steel acquired a 100% 
interest in Lukens, Inc for $ 700.2 billion in cash. Luken’s net assets at the time of the merger were 
$626.5 million. The mark-up of assets is equal to $700.2 – $626.5 = $73.7 million. For the fiscal 
year ended December 31, 1997, Bethlehem Steel (Lukens) had earnings of $239 ($13.4) million 
and net operating assets of $1456 ($486) million. The return on assets of the hypothetical entity 
comprised of Bethlehem Steel and Lukens for the fiscal year ended December 31, 1997 is equal to 

















RESCO 1.841 0.03 0.894 0.29
LOCAL 3.458 < 0.01 3.132 < 0.01
MTO 2.017 0.02 1.461 0.08
TATO -0.214 0.80 0.6 0.48
DR_INDEX 6.05 < 0.01
Other Factors:
RELSIZE 8.283 0.00 6.393 0.03 8.416 < 0.01 8.99 < 0.01 5.826 0.04 6.658 0.02
Year Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y
R2 0.543 0.571 0.546 0.525 0.59 0.574
n 126 126 126 126 126 126
The table displays cross-sectional regressions in which the dependent variable is FORECASTERR. See Appendix A for variable definitions.
FORECASTERR = α0 + α1DR + α2RELSIZE +  ∑YEAR + ∑ INDUSTRY
DR = RESCO DR = LOCAL DR = MTO DR = TATO
DR = MTO + 
RESCO + LOCAL 
+ TATO DR = DR_INDEX


















Transactions in which target relative value is less than 50% and greater than 
100%
Transactions in which bid premium is less than the target’s pre-merger 
market value
Initial Disruptive Sample
Transactions in which target management turnover information could not be 
found and/or target analyst turnover could not be calculated
Final Disruptive Sample
Total completed merger and acquisition transactions listed on the SDC 
database involving public, non-financial targets and public, non-financial 
acquirers with non-missing financial accounting information announced 
between January 1, 1994 and December 31, 2010
Table 1
Sample Procedures
Panel A: Financial vs. Operating Acquirer Merger Sample Selection Procedures
Total completed merger and acquisition transactions listed on the SDC 
database involving public, non-financial targets and public or private 
acquirers with non-missing financial accounting information announced 
between January 1, 1980 and December 31, 2012
Transactions in which acquirer is not a financial firm
Financial Acquirer Sample
Number of financial acquirer targets that could not be matched with 
operating acquirer targets
Final Financial Acquirer Sample
Final Matched Operating Acquirer Sample
Final Sample

































Panel B: Financial and Operating Acquirer Industry Characteristics
SIC Two-Digit 
Code
% of Financial 
Acquirer Sample

















Panel A: Financial vs. Operating Acquirer Merger Sample
Full Sample      
N = 240
Financial Acquirers 
(OP_ACQ = 0)       
N = 120
Operating Acquirers   
(OP_ACQ = 1)        
N = 120
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BV_T 188 0.79 0.58 1.35 0.10 1.72
CASH 188 0.07 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.00
EQ1 172 -0.07 -0.04 0.09 -0.15 -0.01
EQ2 172 -0.07 -0.05 0.09 -0.16 0.00
FORECASTERR 126 0.56 0.30 0.67 0.06 1.24
IND 188 0.74 1.00 0.44 0.00 1.00
LEVERAGE 188 0.27 0.19 2.60 0.00 1.67
LIQUIDITY 185 0.27 0.23 0.26 -0.02 0.64
MTB 184 2.82 2.20 3.89 0.64 6.70
MTO 188 0.61 1.00 0.49 0.00 1.00
DR_INDEX 188 0.47 0.50 0.24 0.25 0.75
RESCO 188 0.49 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00
LOCAL 188 0.21 0.00 0.41 0.00 1.00
MULTIBID 188 0.06 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.00
PREMIUM 188 1.79 1.49 1.05 1.10 2.60
PUBLICACQ 188 0.73 0.47 1.04 0.05 1.54
RELSIZE 126 0.71 0.70 0.14 0.54 0.93
ROA_T 188 0.11 0.02 1.60 -0.70 0.57
TATO 188 0.49 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00
ΔROA_T 187 0.19 0.01 0.92 -0.26 0.64
Panel C: Public Operating Acquirer Merger Sample
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BATH 170 0.71 1.00 0.45 0.00 1.00
BHRET 170 0.15 0.08 0.50 -0.42 0.97
BONUS 122 0.61 1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00
BTM_IND 170 0.14 0.00 0.35 0.00 1.00
CASH 170 0.09 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.00
DR_INDEX 170 0.40 0.25 0.25 0.00 0.75
DR_LO 170 0.52 1.00 0.51 0.00 1.00
FORACC_HI 170 0.50 1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00
GW% 170 0.33 0.21 0.48 0.00 0.78
GW_IMPAIR 170 0.22 0.00 0.41 0.00 1.00
LEVERAGE 170 0.21 0.19 0.17 0.00 0.45
LOCAL 170 0.21 0.00 0.41 0.00 1.00
MTO 170 0.68 1.00 0.47 0.00 1.00
NUMSEG 170 0.96 0.69 0.65 0.00 1.80
MULTIBID 170 0.07 0.00 0.26 0.00 1.00
PREMIUM 170 1.67 1.47 0.89 1.08 2.35
RANK 170 85.00 85.50 48.80 17.50 152.50
RESCO 170 0.00 0.00 0.47 0.00 1.00
RESIDUAL 119 0.00 0.00 0.26 -0.22 0.27
RESIDUAL' 119 0.00 0.00 0.56 -0.54 0.48
SIZE 170 7.55 7.40 1.88 5.31 10.25
TATO 170 0.37 0.00 0.48 0.00 1.00
TENURE 107 1.67 1.80 0.88 0.00 2.63
ΔOCF 166 -0.01 0.00 0.09 -0.10 0.09
ΔSALES 166 0.14 0.10 0.24 -0.06 0.40
Panel D: Deal Characteristics and Post-Merger Sample
See Appendix A for variable definitions. Panel A reports descriptive statistics for the operating targets of 
financial vs. operating acquirers. Coefficients in bold represent statistically significant differences at less than 
the 10 percent level between the two groups. Panel B reports acquirer and target industry characteristics for the 
financial and operating acquirer sample.  Panel C reports descriptive statistics for the sample of operating targets 
used to examine cross-sectional variation of the relevance of accounting information for public, operating 
acquirers. Panel D reports post-merger descriptive statistics for a subsample of the operating acquirers in Panel 
C.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1 OP_ACQ 0.06 -0.34 0.12 0.15 -0.05 0.11 0.06 -0.13 -0.02 -0.19
2 BV_T -0.01 0.05 0.18 0.12 -0.03 0.08 -0.30 0.13 0.25 0.00
3 CASH -0.36 -0.01 -0.03 -0.10 0.03 0.22 -0.01 0.13 -0.07 0.05
4 EQ1 0.12 0.18 -0.03 0.89 0.14 -0.04 0.13 0.09 -0.07 0.00
5 EQ2 0.15 0.12 -0.10 0.89 0.08 -0.12 0.05 0.07 -0.08 -0.06
6 LEVERAGE -0.10 0.14 -0.02 0.14 0.08 -0.12 0.57 0.17 -0.14 0.02
7 LIQUIDITY 0.12 -0.05 0.21 -0.04 -0.12 -0.12 0.05 0.03 -0.12 0.03
8 MTB 0.05 -0.27 -0.04 0.13 0.05 0.52 0.09 0.13 -0.25 0.05
9 MULTIBID -0.11 0.11 0.15 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.06 -0.05 -0.07
10 PREMIUM -0.02 0.50 -0.06 -0.07 -0.08 0.00 -0.16 -0.21 -0.01 -0.07
11 ROA_T -0.16 -0.02 0.05 0.00 -0.06 0.01 0.04 0.06 -0.06 -0.06
Table 3
Correlations
Panel A: Financial vs. Operating Acquirer Merger Sample
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
1 BV_T 0.01 0.07 0.14 0.10 0.17 0.10 -0.32 -0.02 -0.05 -0.11 -0.10 0.20 -0.05 0.28 -0.08 0.06 -0.08
2 CASH 0.03 0.14 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.14 -0.08 -0.12 0.02 -0.18 0.05 -0.12 -0.06 -0.16 -0.02 0.07 -0.03
3 EQ1 0.07 0.14 0.92 0.14 -0.01 -0.10 -0.34 -0.05 0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.04 0.04 -0.03 -0.10 -0.06 -0.04
4 EQ2 0.14 0.05 0.92 0.09 0.01 -0.10 -0.33 -0.10 0.00 -0.11 -0.09 -0.01 0.05 -0.03 -0.12 -0.01 -0.04
5 IND 0.11 0.09 0.14 0.09 0.08 -0.09 -0.13 0.08 0.16 0.11 -0.08 -0.04 0.14 -0.01 -0.15 -0.01 -0.03
6 LEVERAGE 0.13 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.04 -0.02 0.46 0.00 -0.05 0.17 0.01 -0.14 -0.15 -0.35 0.00 0.01 0.00
7 LIQUIDITY 0.05 0.07 -0.10 -0.10 -0.02 -0.07 0.06 0.09 0.00 0.03 0.25 -0.07 -0.09 -0.08 0.08 0.17 -0.01
8 MTB -0.32 -0.09 -0.34 -0.33 -0.09 0.41 0.16 0.07 -0.12 0.22 0.17 -0.10 -0.02 -0.30 0.22 -0.01 -0.02
9 DR_INDEX -0.04 -0.19 -0.05 -0.10 0.02 0.00 0.11 0.04 0.49 0.60 0.47 0.45 -0.04 0.08 0.12 0.11 -0.01
10 MTO 0.02 -0.01 0.06 0.00 0.05 -0.04 -0.03 -0.16 0.49 0.01 0.08 -0.12 0.04 0.07 -0.13 -0.17 0.06
11 RESCO -0.13 -0.19 -0.06 -0.11 0.07 0.18 0.05 0.21 0.53 -0.09 0.11 0.04 -0.06 -0.03 0.12 0.18 0.03
12 LOCAL -0.13 -0.01 -0.06 -0.09 -0.07 -0.04 0.24 0.14 0.49 0.06 0.11 -0.10 -0.04 -0.10 0.18 0.12 0.05
13 TATO 0.15 -0.15 -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 -0.10 -0.02 -0.10 0.48 -0.02 0.00 -0.08 -0.01 0.19 0.10 0.10 -0.14
14 MULTIBID -0.01 -0.07 0.04 0.05 0.10 -0.15 -0.10 -0.08 -0.03 0.10 -0.11 -0.02 -0.03 -0.06 -0.02 -0.03 0.10
15 PREMIUM 0.40 -0.16 -0.03 -0.03 0.01 -0.23 -0.14 -0.29 0.08 0.15 -0.09 -0.09 0.18 -0.02 -0.08 -0.01 -0.18
16 ROA_T -0.06 -0.02 -0.10 -0.12 -0.12 -0.01 0.09 0.21 0.11 -0.11 0.11 0.16 0.08 -0.02 -0.07 0.45 -0.04
17 ΔROA_T 0.03 0.04 -0.06 -0.01 0.03 0.00 0.23 0.11 0.01 -0.13 0.08 0.07 0.00 -0.04 -0.04 0.39 -0.08
18 RELSIZE -0.07 0.01 -0.04 -0.04 -0.01 0.05 -0.05 -0.07 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.01 -0.06 -0.01 -0.07 -0.04 -0.06
Panel B: Public Operating Acquirer Merger Sample
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
1 BATH -0.18 0.18 -0.25 -0.05 -0.04 0.08 0.00 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 -0.01 0.07 -0.14 -0.15 0.13 0.03 0.00 0.15 -0.12 0.04 0.00 -0.20
2 BHRET -0.13 -0.21 0.13 -0.04 -0.24 0.14 -0.02 0.21 0.25 0.36 -0.15 -0.32 -0.29 -0.09 0.09 0.27 -0.09 0.06 0.12 -0.35 -0.06 0.09 -0.03 0.20
3 BONUS 0.16 -0.16 -0.33 0.10 0.09 -0.06 -0.07 -0.13 -0.21 -0.03 -0.09 -0.04 0.03 -0.19 -0.09 0.02 0.05 -0.12 -0.11 0.06 0.27 -0.06 0.15 0.02
4 BTM_IND -0.16 0.13 -0.26 0.06 -0.09 -0.02 -0.15 0.16 0.23 0.01 -0.13 -0.07 0.01 0.12 0.07 0.02 -0.05 0.12 0.11 -0.24 0.03 -0.01 -0.15 -0.02
5 CASH 0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.12 0.13 0.08 0.12 -0.13 -0.02 0.09 -0.02 -0.10 -0.15 -0.20 0.06 -0.25 0.07 0.01 -0.03 -0.08 0.01 -0.04 -0.01
6 DR_INDEX 0.07 -0.19 0.16 -0.11 -0.20 -0.87 -0.12 -0.06 -0.01 -0.14 0.58 0.59 -0.05 0.08 0.04 -0.24 0.69 -0.01 -0.27 -0.04 0.56 -0.05 -0.05 -0.14
7 DR_LO -0.04 0.14 -0.08 0.05 0.18 -0.85 0.26 0.08 0.00 0.12 -0.54 -0.45 0.06 -0.02 -0.03 0.17 -0.64 0.04 0.25 0.06 -0.48 0.00 -0.01 0.13
8 FORACC_HI -0.11 -0.07 -0.03 -0.14 0.12 -0.13 0.18 0.05 -0.15 0.01 -0.01 0.19 0.25 0.20 -0.10 0.15 -0.27 -0.16 0.01 0.12 -0.16 -0.07 0.10 0.28
9 GW% 0.02 0.08 -0.11 0.06 0.08 -0.01 -0.02 0.07 0.16 0.00 -0.03 0.12 -0.03 0.12 -0.15 0.08 -0.17 0.09 0.05 -0.12 -0.03 0.16 -0.25 0.21
10 GW_IMPAIR -0.03 0.14 -0.20 0.23 -0.07 -0.01 0.06 -0.13 0.21 0.05 -0.02 -0.16 0.01 0.07 -0.11 -0.03 0.16 0.21 0.18 -0.33 -0.02 -0.02 -0.13 -0.04
11 LEVERAGE -0.11 0.11 -0.06 -0.05 0.05 -0.16 0.18 0.16 0.08 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.27 -0.21 0.18 0.78 -0.21 0.07 0.13 -0.07 -0.10 0.40 -0.09 0.03
12 LOCAL 0.00 -0.10 -0.03 -0.05 -0.01 0.58 -0.49 -0.08 0.01 -0.01 -0.12 0.24 -0.03 -0.04 -0.12 -0.05 0.18 0.00 -0.30 0.20 0.05 -0.03 -0.13 -0.18
13 MTO -0.01 -0.16 0.05 -0.04 -0.02 0.46 -0.34 0.11 0.06 -0.02 0.22 0.09 0.04 0.20 0.06 -0.10 0.24 -0.07 -0.11 0.07 0.04 -0.08 0.03 0.08
14 NUMSEG -0.05 -0.18 -0.01 0.04 -0.10 0.05 -0.09 0.28 0.06 0.08 -0.09 -0.06 0.08 0.10 -0.24 -0.05 0.11 -0.20 -0.12 0.33 -0.22 -0.13 -0.01 0.14
15 MULTIBID -0.02 0.08 -0.14 0.08 -0.08 0.05 -0.01 0.12 0.05 0.02 -0.07 -0.01 0.16 0.06 -0.07 0.01 0.03 0.13 0.01 0.30 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.12
16 PREMIUM -0.15 -0.06 0.03 0.07 -0.16 0.07 -0.08 -0.09 -0.11 -0.12 0.06 -0.12 0.06 -0.01 -0.08 0.00 0.03 0.45 0.49 -0.10 0.10 0.05 0.06 0.08
17 RANK -0.18 0.06 -0.02 -0.04 0.10 -0.24 0.19 0.25 0.07 -0.05 0.85 -0.17 0.22 0.01 0.03 0.03 -0.28 -0.03 -0.10 0.16 -0.13 0.40 -0.12 0.18
18 RESCO 0.10 -0.10 0.07 -0.12 -0.17 0.57 -0.51 -0.13 -0.04 0.04 -0.21 0.12 -0.18 0.10 -0.05 -0.02 -0.21 0.08 -0.18 0.01 0.19 -0.08 -0.03 -0.12
19 RESIDUAL -0.01 0.00 -0.09 0.18 0.06 -0.03 0.04 -0.09 0.08 0.19 0.04 0.04 -0.02 -0.16 0.07 0.36 -0.01 -0.04 0.62 0.01 -0.04 0.22 -0.04 -0.04
20 RESIDUAL' -0.09 -0.04 -0.18 0.12 0.01 -0.32 0.30 0.02 0.16 0.12 0.10 -0.19 0.07 -0.03 -0.04 0.53 0.03 -0.19 0.57 -0.17 -0.08 0.09 0.00 0.01
21 SIZE 0.00 -0.15 0.07 -0.28 0.00 -0.06 0.09 0.29 -0.04 -0.25 0.21 0.01 0.16 0.14 0.22 -0.14 0.29 0.01 -0.03 -0.21 -0.34 0.00 0.02 0.09
22 TATO 0.11 0.06 0.25 -0.03 -0.12 0.55 -0.51 -0.18 -0.11 -0.06 -0.22 0.04 -0.04 -0.07 0.00 0.20 -0.24 0.09 -0.04 -0.10 -0.34 0.06 0.01 -0.10
23 TENURE 0.00 0.07 -0.20 -0.02 0.19 -0.16 0.12 0.07 0.11 -0.03 0.28 -0.07 -0.17 -0.07 0.02 0.00 0.26 -0.12 0.23 0.17 -0.05 -0.04 0.06 0.08
24 ΔOCF -0.01 0.11 0.13 -0.05 -0.02 0.09 -0.13 -0.04 -0.08 0.02 -0.08 -0.01 0.06 0.00 0.04 0.05 -0.11 0.03 -0.10 -0.07 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.19
25 ΔSALES -0.16 0.02 0.09 0.06 -0.02 -0.07 0.07 0.04 0.06 -0.01 0.03 -0.18 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.09 0.11 -0.01 0.00 0.13 -0.12 -0.06 0.15 0.12
Panel C: Deal Characteristics and Post-Merger Sample











OP_ACQ 0.11 0.06 0.13 0.10 -0.06 0.37 -0.05 0.61
OP_ACQ × ROA_T -0.06 0.09 -0.07 0.07 -0.06 0.10 -0.07 0.07
OP_ACQ × BV_T 0.34 < 0.01 0.38 < 0.01
ROA_T 0.02 0.16 0.02 0.16 0.02 0.17 0.02 0.19
BV_T 0.03 0.29 0.00 0.93 0.00 0.93
Other Factors:
MULTIBID -0.01 0.97 -0.04 0.79
CASH -0.16 0.02 -0.18 0.02
LIQUIDITY 0.12 0.29 0.12 0.68
LEVERAGE 0.04 0.11 0.00 0.98
MTB -0.01 0.75 0.01 0.43
PUBLICACQ -0.08 0.33 -0.13 0.14
Adj-R2 0.02 0.04 0.32 0.34
n 240 240 240 240
Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4
Dependent Variable: PREMIUM
Table 4
Operating Acquirers' Differential Use of Targets' ROA and Book Value in Setting Bid Premium
Panel A: Industry defined by 4-digit SIC code
PREMIUM = α0 + α1OP_ACQ + α2aOP_ACQ × ROA_T + α2bOP_ACQ × BV_T + α3aROA_T + α3bBV_T + α4MULTIBID + α5CASH + 











OP_ACQ 0.14 < 0.01 0.02 0.84 0.03 0.56 -0.12 0.17
OP_ACQ x ROA_T -0.03 0.12 -0.03 0.08 -0.04 0.03 -0.03 0.09
OP_ACQ x BV_T 0.16 < 0.01 0.16 < 0.01
ROA_T 0.02 0.13 0.01 0.35 0.02 0.16 0.01 0.39
BV_T -0.01 0.71 0.00 0.86
Other Factors:
MULTIBID 0.08 0.51 0.06 0.62
CASH -0.10 0.12 -0.07 0.27
LIQUIDITY -0.11 0.27 -0.13 0.18
LEVERAGE -0.01 0.10 -0.02 0.05
MTB 0.00 0.81 0.01 0.51
PUBLICACQ 0.07 0.43 0.13 0.14
Adj-R2 0.04 0.03 0.07 0.09
n 498 368 498 368
The table displays cross-sectional regressions in which the dependent variable is the bid premium. In Panel A (B), SIC (GIC) codes are used as the industry classification 
scheme. See Appendix A for variable definitions.
Panel B: Industry defined by GIC code










DR_INDEX 0.23 0.18 -0.13 0.58 0.02 0.66
DR_INDEX × ROA_T -0.17 0.04 -0.17 0.02
DR_INDEX × BV_T 0.71 0.09 1.03 0.01
ROA_T 0.06 0.23 0.08 0.08





LEVERAGE -0.14 < 0.01
MTB -0.02 0.02
IND 0.07 0.50
Year Dummies Y Y Y
Industry Dummies Y Y Y
Adj-R2 0.42 0.46 0.59
n 188 188 181
Dependent Variable: PREMIUM
The table displays cross-sectional regressions in which the dependent variable is the bid premium. All specifications include effective merger-
year and 4-digit SIC code industry fixed-effects. See Appendix A for variable definitions.
Table 5
The Effect of Disruption on Acquirers' Use of Targets' ROA and Book Value in Setting Bid Premium
PREMIUM = α0 + α1DR_INDEX + α2aDR_INDEX × ROA_T + α2bDR_INDEX × BV_T + α3aROA_T + α3bBV_T + 
α4MULTIBID + α5CASH + α6LIQUIDITY + α7LEVERAGE + α8MTB + α9IND + δYEAR + λINDUSTRY  + ε







OP_ACQ -0.21 0.14 -0.18 0.22
OP_ACQ × ROA_T -0.05 0.26 -0.05 0.23
OP_ACQ × BV_T 0.39 < 0.01 0.35 < 0.01
OP_ACQ × EQ_T -1.88 0.02 -1.72 0.10
ROA_T 0.02 0.28 0.02 0.38
BV_T 0.06 0.41 0.07 0.36
EQ_T 0.06 0.89 -0.03 0.95
Other Factors:
MULTIBID 0.00 0.99 0.02 0.93
CASH -0.23 0.01 -0.25 < 0.01
LIQUIDITY 0.00 0.97 -0.07 0.66
LEVERAGE -0.03 0.37 -0.03 0.37
MTB 0.02 0.31 0.01 0.55




The table displays cross-sectional regressions in which the dependent variable is the bid premium.  See Appendix A for variable 
definitions.
Table 6
Operating Acquirers' Differential Use of Targets' Earnings Quality in Setting Bid Premium
PREMIUM = α0 + α1OP_ACQ + α2aOP_ACQ × ROA_T + α2bOP_ACQ × BV_T + α2cOP_ACQ × EQ_T + 
α3aROA_T + α3bBV_T + α3cEQ_T + α4MULTIBID + α5CASH + α6LIQUIDITY + α7LEVERAGE + α8MTB + 
α9PUBLICACQ + ε







DR_INDEX -0.54 0.11 -0.57 0.13
DR_INDEX × ROA_T -0.18 0.03 -0.17 0.04
DR_INDEX × BV_T 1.01 0.02 1.20 0.01
DR_INDEX × EQ_T -6.55 0.03 -5.94 0.07
ROA_T 0.08 0.12 0.07 0.15
BV_T -0.10 0.70 -0.21 0.38
EQ_T 2.68 0.07 1.84 0.28
Other Factors:
MULTIBID -0.31 0.06 -0.28 0.10
CASH -0.14 0.42 -0.12 0.48
LIQUIDITY -0.39 0.15 -0.40 0.13
LEVERAGE -0.15 < 0.01 -0.15 < 0.01
MTB -0.03 0.06 -0.03 0.01
IND 0.06 0.66 0.12 0.36
Year Dummies Y Y
Industry Dummies Y Y
Adj-R2 0.34 0.36
n 138 138
The table displays cross-sectional regressions in which the dependent variable is the bid premium.  See Appendix A for variable 
definitions.
Table 7
The Effect of Disruption on Acquirers' Use of Targets' Earnings Quality in Setting Bid Premium
PREMIUM = α0 + α1DR_INDEX + α2aDR_INDEX × ROA_T + α2bDR_INDEX × BV_T + α2cDR_INDEX × EQ_T + 
α3aROA_T + α3bBV_T + α3cEQ_T + α4MULTIBID + α5CASH + α6LIQUIDITY + α7LEVERAGE + α8MTB + α9IND + 
δYEAR + λINDUSTRY + ε








RESIDUAL 3.91 0.05 0.68 0.38
Other Factors:
ΔSALES 0.77 0.80 -1.60 0.07
ΔOCF -2.02 0.25 -3.47 0.54
LEVERAGE 0.76 0.87 0.68 0.85
SIZE -1.07 0.04 -0.67 0.06
NUMSEG 1.18 0.16 1.15 0.31
BTM_IND 0.61 0.53 0.27 0.74
BHRET -2.55 0.03 -2.56 0.01
RANK 0.00 0.99 0.00 0.81
BONUS -1.90 0.07 -2.28 0.03
BATH 0.05 0.96 0.13 0.85
TENURE 0.52 0.16 0.89 0.03
GW% 2.04 0.10 1.16 0.31




Dependent Variable: GW_IMPAIR = 1
The table displays cross-sectional regressions in which the dependent variable is the liklihood of a goodwill impairment. The results 
reported above are based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (clustered at the acquiring firm level). See Appendix A for 
variable definitions.
Table 8
Acquirers' Use of Accounting Information and Goodwill Impairments
Pr(GW_IMPAIR = 1) = logit (α0+ α1 RESIDUAL + α2 ΔSALES + α3 ΔOCF + α4 LEVERAGE + α5 SIZE + α6 
NUMSEG + α7 BTM_IND + α8 BHRET + α9 RANK + α10 BONUS + α11BATH + α12TENURE + α13 GW% +  








FORACC_HI -1.07 0.09 -0.22 0.82
DISRUPT_LO 4.77 0.01
DISRUPT_LO × FORACC_HI -4.78 0.02
Other Factors:
ΔSALES 0.05 -0.05 -0.37 0.73
ΔOCF -2.66 0.62 -5.28 0.39
LEV 2.43 0.50 2.78 0.54
SIZE -0.58 0.03 -0.95 0.03
NUMSEG 1.51 0.01 -0.32 0.01
BTM_IND 0.12 0.89 -0.32 0.81
BHRET 0.03 0.92 0.05 0.89
RANK 0.00 0.69 -0.01 0.60
BONUS -1.22 0.06 -0.12 0.89
BATH 0.89 0.19 -0.08 0.93
TENURE -0.05 0.41 0.02 0.75
GW% 0.94 0.44 1.07 0.36
Year Dummies Y Y
n 106 97
The table displays cross-sectional regressions in which the dependent variable is the liklihood of a goodwill impairment. The results reported above are 
based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (clustered at the acquiring firm level). See Appendix A for variable definitions.
Dependent Variable: GW_IMPAIR = 1
Table 9
The Effect of Disruption on the Predictive Ability of Acquirers' Management
Pr(GW_IMPAIR = 1) = logit (α0+ α1 DR_LO + α2 FORACC_HI + α3 DR_LO × FORACC_HI + α4 ΔSALES + α5 ΔOCF + α6 
LEV + α7 SIZE + α8 NUMSEG + α9 BTM_IND + α10 BHRET + α11 RANK + α12 BONUS + α13BATH + α14TENURE + α15 GW% 
+  δYEAR  + ε)







DISRUPT 0.14 0.14 0.39 0.07
DISRUPT × ΔROA_T -0.07 0.10 -0.63 < 0.01
ΔROA_T 0.02 0.14 0.20 0.06
BV_T 0.02 0.57 0.20 0.09
Other Factors:
MULTIBID 0.00 0.99 -0.41 0.08
CASH -0.20 0.01 -0.01 0.96
LIQUIDITY 0.16 0.17 -0.58 0.04
LEVERAGE 0.04 0.10 -0.11 < 0.01
MTB -0.01 0.67 -0.01 0.45
PUBLICACQ -0.14 0.13
IND -0.16 0.36
Year Dummies N Y




The table displays cross-sectional regressions in which the dependent variable is the bid premium. See Appendix A for variable 
definitions.
Table 10
The Effect of Disruption on Acquirers' Use of the Change in Targets' ROA in Setting Bid Premium
PREMIUM = α0 + α1DISRUPT + α2DISRUPT × ΔROA_T + α3aΔROA_T + α3bBV_T + α4MULTIBID + α5CASH 
+ α6LIQUIDITY + α7LEVERAGE + α8MTB + α9PUBLICACQ + α10IND + δYEAR + λINDUSTRY + ε   
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